Monday, June 22, 2015

From the Special Forces Operation to a look back at the 1965 War, 50 years on: All the articles in one place

http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/standpoint-why-it-s-important-to-remember-the-1965-war-between-india-and-pakistan-2097293

Why it's important to remember the 1965 war between India and Pakistan

Saturday, 20 June 2015 - 4:00pm IST | Agency: dna webdesk

Although the period of June-July every year is normally regarded as the time when the 1999 Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan is remembered and discussed, 2015 is perhaps the right time to understand the genesis of the war that Pakistan initiated and lost half a century ago.

Several factors, not the least the belief among some of Ayub Khan’s hawkish advisers that the general population in Kashmir valley was ready to rise in revolt against India, led Ayub to go along with, what later turned out to be a militarily unsound operational plan. Pakistan’s Military Intelligence and the Foreign Ministry (headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) were of the view that from late 1964 onward, there was a surge in anti-India feelings in the Kashmir valley and the people would be more than willing to welcome Pakistani intervention.

Newspaper reports of the time suggest that the shelling and firing across the CFL (Ceasefire Line, as the Line of Control or LoC was then known), intrusions and other provocative activities increased manifold between January and July 1965. The Army recorded some 1800 such activities in that period as compared to just about 522 in the same period in 1964. In June and July 1965, there were at least half a dozen firing incidents daily across the CFL. The ceasefire violations preceded what was to be one of the largest infiltration planned and executed by Pakistan — much larger in scope than that in Kargil in 1999.

There is consensus among various personal accounts of the 1965 war and newspaper reports of that period that the scheme of infiltration was planned in Pak-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) under the overall command of Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, the then GoC of Pakistan’s 12 Division. All the four sector commanders under Major General Malik were made responsible for organising, training and launching of infiltrators groups from their areas of responsibility. These groups, numbering some 30,000 men, were named the Gibraltar Force. The aim of Operation Gibraltar was clearly laid down - to ‘create large-scale disturbances in Indian-held Kashmir which would force India to take major political and military steps to meet the situation..’

However, the Pakistan army’s Commander-in-Chief Mohammad Musa was not entirely convinced about Operation Gibraltar. In a telling comment, General Musa wrote: “The policy-makers thwarted the professional assessment and advice on matters having grave military implications because of their miscalculation of the politico-strategic situation and the over-ambitiousness of a few individuals involved in decision-making who were prompted by their desire to achieve some quick and spectacular results in Kashmir by clandestine operations.” Musa was mainly talking about Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who had prevailed upon President Mohammad Ayub, that the time was ripe to wrest Kashmir from India once and for all. Fifty years on, it is difficult to believe that the Pakistani Army — currently considered as the ‘deep state’ and perhaps the final arbiter of the nation’s destiny — could have been overruled by a politician like Bhutto.

There were other factors too that contributed to Pakistan’s swagger that time. One, Pakistan was confident that China, its new found ally and friend would make a threatening move against India, if only to keep some of its newly raised formations in the East from being moved into Kashmir. Two, Pakistan’s army was convinced that the modern arms and platforms supplied by the United States were far superior to the Indian army’s World War II vintage armoury, giving it a distinct advantage in any possible conflict.

In 1954, America agreed to arm up to five divisions of the Pakistani Army with the latest weapons and supply modern fighter jets. A Pakistani author has cited how the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) received a massive boost from America. According to one estimate, between 1956 and 1964 Pakistan was supplied with 100 F-86 Sabre jets, one squadron of F-104 Star Fighters, 30 B-57 bombers and four C-130 transport aircrafts, allowing it to narrow the gap with India. In 1965, the Pakistani Army’s armour strength was superior to that of the Indian Army.

The London-based IISS handbook on Military Balance (1965) revealed that Pakistan had 765 tanks in all, against India’s 720 in 1965. Pakistan had nine regiments of the latest Patton tanks supplied by the US, nine regiments of Shermans and three Regiments of Chaffees. India, on the other hand was saddled with right regiments of Shermans, four regiments of Centurians and two regiments of AMX-XIIIs. Pakistan’s artillery too was far superior in quality compared to India’s. While it had one heavy regiment of 155 mm guns and eight-inch Howitzers, India was mostly doing with 120 mm mortars and one heavy regiment of 7.2 inch guns.

Meanwhile, even as China-Pakistan ties were growing stronger, the American military aid continued unabated. Alarmed at the developments, India under Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and his defence minister YB Chavan (appointed by Jawaharlal Nehru in November 1962) took counter-measures to re-arm, expand and modernise the Indian military. Arms assistance from the Soviet Union was gratefully accepted. Yet, India was in no position to wage another war in 1965, having suffered a morale-shattering defeat in 1962. The three services were in the middle of a modernisation and expansion phase and therefore not fully trained or battle ready.

This was indeed one of the reasons why Ayub Khan and his ambitious Foreign Minister Bhutto were keen to press home the advantage that Pakistan seemed to enjoy in that particular period by launching an action that would free Kashmir from India’s ‘clutches.’

Moreover, the Pakistani leadership was not overly impressed by Nehru’s successor, Shastri and assessed that he was a pushover.

Economically too, Pakistan in that period was doing better than India. Politically, Sheikh Abdullah’s falling out with India was seen as an opportune moment by Pakistan, who felt that the Kashmiri population would support an instigated rebellion against India.

That Bhutto and Ayub were proved wrong, both in their assessment about the ‘loyalties’ of the Kashmiris and underestimating the strength and resilience of the Indian military, is a matter of history. After initial setbacks, the Indian Army not only thwarted the Pakistani offensive but also in September 1965, marched right into the heart of Pakistan: Lahore.

Only an UN intervention saved Pakistan the blushes. As India gears up to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the 1965 victory a couple of months from now, it is important to remember Pakistan’s perfidy half a century ago.

The author is currently writing a book on the 1965 war between India and Pakistan.

http://www.abplive.in/author/nitingokhale/2015/06/20/article624331.ece/Reclaiming-the-North-east

A day after the 4 June ambush on the Indian Army's 6 Dogra Battalion in Manipur's Chandel district that killed 18 soldiers, I was in Guwahati at a Rotary Club function, coincidentally kicking off a discussion on why the media in general ignores the North-east or more precisely why is the media coverage of the north-east always trapped in stereotype?

Many media stalwarts from Delhi—all of them from print and in some ways people with fondness for the north-east—as well media practitioners from the region were in attendance. At the same time, many ‘celebrity’ anchors and big names on TV news had either declined or had simply ignored the invite from the organisers. It was as if they were afraid of exposing their own lack of knowldge about the region. Which is not surprising, given the overall ‘illiteracy’ that prevails in rest of India not just in media, but in almost all walks of life.

As the conference got underway, my mind travelled back to the 1980s when I first went to the region as a callow young man and became a journalist. The ignorance about the region was staggering in those years.

Three decades since then, the divide between “north-east” and the mainland has lessened with more exchange of people and ideas between the two. Actually, North-east exists only in the minds of those who are far away from it--physically and mentally. In my view, every state, in fact every district, in the region has a distinct identity.

And yet, generally, the attitude of the people in rest of India towards the North-east is like our treatment of a distant relative who exists in the mind but about whom we know precious little. Our knowledge about this relative is often based on misinformation, half truths and innuendos. That's exactly how rest of the country largely treats the eight states in the North East!

The Centre too looks at the north-east from the prism of law and order and security. The metropolitan media follows suit and gives place to coverage of the north-east only when there is large-scale violence or an incident like the cross-border raid by the Indian Army’s Special Forces into a neighbouring country.

So how should one look at the north-east? There is one view that there is too much money floating around in the region while others hold the view that the region needs much more assistance to bring it at par with rest of the country in terms of infrastructure and development.

The truth lies somewhere in between. The amount of money that is granted to and spent on the North East is mind boggling. Funds are not a problem, their disbursement is. Loads of money has indeed created a class of corrupt, rich people in the region, who consider themselves immune from law.

So, have we lost the North-east forever? Many optimists, like me, are convinced that the North-east has several things going for itself to catch up with the rest of the country. Unlike most other states, the North-east has a very high percentage of literacy. This itself should be a major strength. All that this pool of manpower resources needs is proper direction. Take the natural resources available with the region. Arunachal Pradesh has so much of water resources available that it can produce about 30,000 MW of electricity through hydel projects. This energy is not only sufficient to feed the region’s states but also to export to the neighbouring countries as well. Another point that the North-east has in its favour is the proximity to South-east Asia.

Identified by economic experts as the boom area of the 21st century, South-east Asia is best accessed from North-east India. The big question however is, who will do this? Not retired mandarins. Not people from MHA. Not people from rest of India. Ultimately, it is the civil society, well-meaning politicians and committed bureaucrats, who will have to take up the lost cause and bring the North-east out of its current mess. Only then rest of India will start looking at the North-east more seriously. Only then others will start treating the North-east not as an exotic faraway entity but as an integral part of the idea that is India.

(http://policywonks.in/commentary/an-excellent-indian-army-operation-overshadowed-by-poor-communications)

An Excellent Indian Army Operation Overshadowed by Poor Communications

Full marks to political will and military acumen, but the government should work on its strategic communication skills.

By Nitin Gokhale Jun 12,20153 Comments

As it usually happens in India, a precise, excellent special operation by the Indian Army against a group of north-east insurgents hiding in camps located within the geographical boundaries of Myanmar last Tuesday, has got overshadowed by some ill-advised pronouncements by ministers and an even sillier questions posed by ill-informed television anchors.

While junior ministers went a little overboard in claiming the successful raid as a warning to all of India’s neighbours, multiple voices diluted the impact of the cross-border raid. The TV debates—focusing mostly on the question: can the operation in Myanmar be replicated elsewhere (read, Pakistan)--further vitiated the atmosphere.

In all the shrill noises, three standout aspects of the operation have been more or less forgotten. One, the swift response by the top political leadership in giving a go-ahead for a counter-offensive inside Myanmar. Two, the skills and effectiveness of India’s Special Forces and three, the India-Myanmar military cooperation that allowed the forces to cross over and raid militant camps inside that country.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, his National security Adviser Ajit Doval, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and Home Minister Rajnath Singh were quick to seek action against the perpetrators of the June 4 ambush on an army unit in Manipur that killed 18 soldiers. Once the political backing was forthcoming, the Army chose its best force trained for counter-insurgency and jungle warfare, the 21 Para (Special Forces), based in Jorhat and directly reporting to the Eastern Command. Nicknamed Waghnkh (Tiger’s Claw)--the unit was originally 21 Maratha Light Infantry battalion before being fully converted into a Para (SF) battalion—after Chattrapati Shivaji’s famous act of killing Afzal Khan by using the waghnakh, the 21 Para (SF) were tasked to hit the two camps located not very far from the border.

Detailed appreciation of the camps was made based on both HUMINT (human intelligence) and TechInt (technical intelligence) which had confirmed presence of a substantial number of insurgents in these camps. They troops also had a fair idea about the firepower the occupants of the camp possessed. At dawn on June 9, in less than a week after the ambush on 6 Dogras, the Special Forces had walked about six km inside Myanmar, the camps in their cross hairs. Soon, the assault was on. A firefight between an assortment of insurgents (those belonging to the NSCN-Khaplang group, Paresh Baruah's ULFA boys, members of UNLF, KYKL and PREPAK) and the army troops ensued. Many were killed, several injured. As the remaining insurgents fled, the troops started their return march. Incredibly, the Army's Special Forces had suffered no casualty. Months of hard training had paid off.

As the details begun to emerge, Myanmar acknowledged India’s operation: Zaw Htay, director of the office of Myanmar President Thein Sein, confirmed to The Wall Street Journal a day after the raid that Indian troops had entered his country. He said that there was “coordination and cooperation” between the Indian troops and Myanmar’s armed forces based in the area of the raids, but added that no Myanmar soldiers were directly involved. “We will never allow or support insurgents, whether [they are] against Myanmar or against our neighbouring countries,” Mr. Zaw Htay added. However, some ill-considered statements by ministers not directly involved in planning or decision-making and the breathless media narrative which started extrapolating and speculating about the possibility of a similar action on the Pakistan border, forced the Myanmarese to back off and deny that the raid took place inside their country.

As the government began assessing the aftermath of the clinical operation, it had to take note of one major shortcoming: Its strategic communication during a development such as a special operation of this kind, needed to be fine-tuned and brought in sync with the requirement of today’s media landscape which abhors information vacuum. In coming months, top decision-makers will surely find ways to overcome this lacuna.

The sometime silly, many times farcical debates on some of the TV channels notwithstanding, the fact is the 4 June ambush and the subsequent cross-border raid by Indian Special Forces has brought the focus right back on the north-east and China's renewed attempts to stir trouble in the region

For over 15 years since 2000, news from the region had been marked with good tidings: peace engagement with various rebel groups, improved security cooperation with Myanmar and Bangladesh, fragmentation of bigger outfits like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA).

The region's biggest insurgent group--the Issac-Muivah group of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland or NSCN-IM--has been in a ceasefire mode with the Government of India since 1997. Its rival group, the Khaplang faction of the NSCN or NSCN-K, led by SS Khaplang, a Burmese Naga, also agreed to a truce three years later only to walk out of it earlier this year after the Indian government objected to the group coming to an arrangement with the Myanmar government.

Since then, in a series of attacks on the security forces and especially on troops of the Indian army and the Assam Rifles, the NSCN-K has upped the ante. By launching big, spectacular attacks in collaboration with other outfits the Khaplang group is hoping to establish its leadership among many other insurgent groups in the region. That it has recently managed to bring together disparate groups spread across different states in the region, is a fact that has not gone unnoticed. A new front calling itself National Liberation Front of West South-east Asia, has been announced in recent months after a meeting convened by the NSCN-K somewhere in the Sagiang Division of Western Myanmar.

That's where the covert Chinese hand is now slowly becoming evident. For nearly eight years now there have been stray incidents pointing to increased Chinese focus on the north-east. In October 2007, on the invitation of the Chinese authorities, Anthony Shimray, in charge of the NSCN(IM)’s foreign affairs had visited China. He handed over to the Chinese a letter from Muivah, self-styled “prime minister” of NSCN(IM), naming Kholose Swu Sumi, a Sema Naga from Zunheboto, their “permanent representative” in China. The Chinese welcomed this and wanted Kholose to keep them updated on the movements of the Indian army, particularly in Arunachal, the activities of the Dalai Lama and Tibetans and on the NSCN(IM)’s peace talks with the Indian government.

In 2008, a north-east militant who chose to surrender to authorities had revealed how groups of insurgents from the region were travelling to the Yunnan province to receive training and then return with arms. In April 2009, it was the turn of Isak Chisi Swu, the NSCN(IM) president involved in talks with New Delhi, to visit China. Paresh Baruah of ULFA, too, visited China in 2010. Reports say he led a group of 80 cadres which received training and weapons in Yunnan province that year.

But it was in 2011 and 2012 that the renewed Chinese interest in insurgencies in the northeastern states became more pronounced. Two major conclaves of north-eastern insurgent leaders were organised by the Chinese at Taga in Western Myanmar. The Khaplang group incidentally has major presence in the area.

Chinese involvement in the north-east is not new. In the 1960s, it had backed the Naga rebels allowing them to travel to China and giving some arms. Subsequently however between the 1970s and 2000s, China lowered its focus only to re-engage the north-eastern rebels in a big way since the beginning of this decade. Past week’s developments in Nagaland and Manipur will prod security managers of the country to refocus on securing the north-east if India wants to realise the true potential of its 'Act East' policy.

(The author is a national security analyst and a long-time north-east watcher, having spent 23 years living and reporting from that region between 1983 and 2006. He has also had the opportunity to walk across into Myanmar with rebel groups and visit their camps in those years)

http://www.deccanchronicle.com/150614/commentary-op-ed/article/will-nay-pyi-taw-dance-delhi%E2%80%99s-tune-0

Will Nay Pyi Taw dance to Delhi’s tune?

A view of the new parliament building complex under construction in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar (Photo: AP)

The closest South Asia version of Wild West is perhaps the jungles that make for a porous border between India’s Northeast and Myanmar. It is unguarded, is dotted with thick forests and untamed rivers, and is enveloped in energy-sapping heat and humidity most of the time in a year. It was here that the Japanese met their Waterloo in World War II beaten as they were by better-acclimatised Indian soldiers in the British 14th Army led by the irrepressible General William Slims. The Japanese, on a winning spree till then, were thrown back into the sea as the British army pushed them back all the way from Kohima and Imphal.

And it is in this area that the contemporary Indian Army’s crack Parachute unit, the 21 Special Forces, launched a limited cross-border raid on two insurgent camps located about 7 km inside the Myanmar territory on June 9. The ‘guesstimate’ of the number of killed and wounded has varied from 7 to 100. Officially, the Indian army has only chosen to say ‘significant casualties were inflicted on them.’ Sources in the know have put the figure of dead between 35 and 40.

Whatever the number, the fact is, the Indian establishment broke away from its usual hesitation in launching a pre-emptive strike against a group of Northeast insurgents who have recently come together to form an anti-India front with support from elements within the Chinese establishment.

An assortment of Northeast insurgent groups (a veritable alphabet soup-NSCN-K, PLA, UNLF, KYKL, KCP, ULFA, NDFB-S) have once again come together to form a front ostensibly to create a separate homeland for ethnic tribes in the region. It goes by a rather unwieldy name-United Liberation Front of West South East Asia. Helped by friendly Chinese ex-soldiers and Intelligence operatives and a safe haven in the Sagiang division of Western Myanmar these groups are led by Shangwang Shangyung Khaplang, a Hemi Naga from Myanmar as its chairman.

In his mid-70s, Khaplang has been heading a faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K) named after him since 1988 when he split from his erstwhile comrades Thuingaleng Muivah and Issac Chisi Swu, leaders of the I-M (Issac-Muivah) faction of NSCN.

Currently being treated for an unspecified ailment in a Yangon hospital, Khaplang has always played second fiddle to the I-M faction after their break up in 1988. All three were followers of the original Naga rebel Angami Zaphu Phizo, the man who launched the Naga insurgency in the 1950s only to fade away into oblivion in the 1970s. Khaplang and Muivah were among the few top insurgent leaders who had travelled to China in the mid-1960s to seek the Communist leadership’s support for their objectives. From the 1970s, China, busy with its own economic development, has been rather lukewarm to the Northeast insurgents. Of late — for the past six-seven years at least — the Chinese have however started showing greater interest in keeping the pot boiling in the Northeast.

In 2008, a Northeast militant who chose to surrender to authorities had revealed how groups of insurgents from the region were travelling to the Yunnan province to receive training and then return with arms. In April 2009, it was the turn of Isak Chisi Swu, the NSCN (IM) president involved in talks with New Delhi, to visit China. Paresh Baruah of ULFA, too, visited China in 2010 after he was forced to flee from Bangladesh in the wake of a major crackdown against the Northeast militants by the Sheikh Hasina government in Dhaka. Now Baruah, younger than Khaplang, is the key unifier in the new arrangement. In 2011 and 2012 the renewed Chinese interest in insurgencies in the north-eastern states became more pronounced. Two major conclaves of Northeastern insurgent leaders were organised by the Chinese at Taga in Western Myanmar.

Thin on the ground in western Myanmar and busy battling major insurgencies in the east and north of the country, the Myanmarese army has very little control in the areas bordering India’s Northeast. The Indian insurgents groups therefore find it convenient to operate from these areas.

Last Tuesday’s strike on the camps will however force the grouping to re-evaluate its policy and move further inward into Myanmar. The key question is: Will Nay Pyi Taw cooperate and crack down after a minor wrinkle that has appeared in its dealings with New Delhi?

Some ill-considered statements by junior Indian ministers not directly involved in planning or decision-making in the Special Operation and the breathless media narrative which started extrapolating and speculating about the possibility of a similar action on the Pakistan border, forced the Myanmarese to back off and deny that the raid took place inside their country after Zaw Htay, director of the office of Myanmar President Thein Sein, confirmed to The Wall Street Journal a day after the raid that Indian troops had entered his country.

He was quoted by WSJ saying that there was “coordination and cooperation” between the Indian troops and Myanmar’s armed forces based in the area of the raids, but added that no Myanmar soldiers were directly involved. “We will never allow or support insurgents, whether (they are) against Myanmar or against our neighbouring countries,” Mr. Zaw Htay had said.

India’s National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval is likely to be in Myanmar on Monday and Tuesday to re-tweak the Indo-Myanmar security cooperation. The outcome of his visit will largely determine the trajectory of future operations in the border areas.

– The writer is a national security analyst and specialises on the Northeast, having lived and reported from the region between 1983 and 2006

http://www.abplive.in/author/nitingokhale/2015/06/13/article617705.ece/Why-Special-Forces-need-more-support

Closer home, the 9 June cross-border raid inside Myanmar by India’s 21 Para (Special Forces) aimed at neutralising north-east insurgents taking shelter in two camps has brought the limelight right back on these elite troops although it is nowhere as big aor risky operation that India's Special Forces have carried out in the past.

Converted into Special Forces from a regular infantry unit (21 Maratha Light Infantry), the 21 Para (Special Forces) is based in Assam’s Jorhat and directly reports to the Eastern Command. Nicknamed Waghnakh (Tiger’s Claw) after Chattrapati Shivaji’s famous act of killing Afzal Khan by using the waghnakh, the 21 Para (SF) were tasked to hit the two camps located not very far from the border because it specialises in such missions. In any case, all Parachute regiment units are mandated to train and carry out covert and direct action in counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency campaigns, subversion and sabotage deep inside enemy territory during war, surgical strikes behind enemy lines, hostage rescue and unconventional warfare. India at the moment has 10 such battalions raised over time.

While many of their missions are of tactical nature, the impact that the action of Para units carry out have a strategic impact. Two main examples come to mind immediately.

In the 1971 war, the 2 Para Battalion Group hastened the surrender of Pakistani forces in what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) after a spectacular airborne assault –was executed on December 11, 197. It is by far one of the best examples of Army-Air Force coordination and the ability of the Indian military leadership to seize the initiative through unusual means. One thousand paratroopers from the 50 Independent Parachute Brigade, under the 2 Para battalion group were airdropped by 50 transport aircraft assembled by the Indian Air Force. The assault in broad day light took the Pakistanis by complete surprise and hastened the end of the war as a retreating Pakistani brigade was decimated at Tangail between 11 and 13 December.

Again, it was a combination of a bold Indian para-commando Capt TK Ghosh and young, fiery guerrilla leader of the Mukti Bahini, Kader ‘Tiger’ Siddiqui who prepared the DZ (dropping zone) for the commandos. Ghosh, who retired as a brigadier, spent over 10 days behind enemy lines to prepare the ground with Mukti Bahini for what was to become the biggest airborne assault post-WW II!

The other stunning operation (Operation Cactus) with international ramifications was carried out by the 6 Para Battalion in November 1988 in Maldives. Abdul Gayoom, then President of Maldives was facing a coup engineered by one of rivals Abdul Lutufi, with the help of mercenaries belonging to Tamil secessionist group from Sri Lanka –PLOTE or Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam. The coup plotters had taken over most of the government buildings, the airport, and the harbour but failed to catch hold of President Gayoom who fled from house to house even as he appealed to India for help. Within nine hours of his appeal elements of India’s 50 Parachute Brigade, spearheaded by 6 Para battalion and 17 Para Field Regiment landed in Male, the capital onboard the IAF’s IL-76 after flying 2000 km from Agra. They secured the airport, commandeered boats and rescued President Gayoom even as the mercenaries fled towards Sri Lanka. They were intercepted by Indian Naval ships. All the three services had displayed quick coordination and swift action that saved President Gayoom’s government. Some of the young officer paratroopers who participated in that operation are now in senior ranks, still serving in the Army. The Indian action earned praised worldwide but also created disquiet in the region, especially in Pakistan just as the latest action inside Myanmar has done.

The usefulness of the Special Forces was also proved in the 1999 Kargil skirmish when 9 of the 10 Para battalions were deployed in different sectors to carry out specialised operations. As for 21 Para (SF), its most celebrated and publicly-known success in recent times was Operation Summer Storm in April 2009 when it neutralised a group of Meitei insurgents using the Loktak Lake near Imphal as a hideout.

Given their spectacular achievements over the years, the Indian government needs to pay more attention to strengthening and equipping the Special Forces so that they can continue to strike fear in the hearts of the country’s adversaries.

Monday, June 1, 2015

The May collection for ABP

Every weekend, I write a column for ABP News(abplive.in). Here's the collection for May.

Why foreigners see India differently now

Sun, May 31, 2015

(http://www.abplive.in/author/nitingokhale/2015/05/31/article604342.ece/Why-foreigners-see-India-differently-now )

Very often, domestic politics and TV studios-based media narrative makes us forget the fact that for the first time in 30 years, there is a single-party majority in Lok Sabha. One year after Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister riding on a huge wave of expectations, opinion polls have tended to show a decline in his popularity. Many hours of studio discussions have been devoted to dissecting the Modi government’s 12 months in power. As is their wont, there is no conclusion at the end of those acrimonious shouting matches that play out on our TV screens.

Non-Indians however look at the developments in the past 12 months and the rise of Modi completely differently. Two conversations over the past two weeks with two foreigners have been rather revealing. A British expatriate, a staunch conservative supporter, commenting on Narendra Modi’s one year at the helm, remarked: “He reminds me of Mrs (Margaret) Thatcher. Strong-willed, opinionated and focussed totally on what he has set out to achieve, not bothered about constant carping and criticism heaped on him.” Taken by surprise with the observation, I asked him to elaborate a bit. “Mr Modi, like Mrs Thatcher, has that streak of stubbornness which infuriates the opposition but is effective in producing desired results from the often reluctant administration,” he explained.

While one can debate and differ on the observation, there is no doubt that Prime Minister Modi evokes strong feelings. But most people watching the Prime Minister’s Office also admit that he is clearly focussed on what the government wants to do in the next five years and does not get distracted with all the sniping and criticism that is natural in as raucous a democracy as India’s.

But it was not until Modi’s China visit was over a fortnight ago that one realised how foreigners, especially the Chinese, look at Modi’s persona differently than we Indians do. Astute observers of the Sino-India tango now tend to agree that a subtle but important change in the Chinese approach towards India is primarily propelled by their assessment that Modi brings the necessary heft to the office of the Prime Minister. After all, who else but the Chinese leadership, more than anyone else in the world, would understand the importance of single-party majority?

So, post-May 2014, Beijing’s dealings with India have been different than their earlier stand. They laid out a red carpet for the Prime Minister with President Xi personally welcoming Modi at Xian, not very far from Xi’s own village. Diplomats have observed that the Chinese were rather surprised by the degree of directness and candour displayed by Prime Minister Modi during his interaction with President Xi Jingping and Premier Li Keqiang.

Not just the Chinese but the world at large is looking at India with renewed hope and confidence, thanks in large measure to Modi's persona and the fact that there is a single party majority government in Delhi. So no matter what his opponents say--they often describe his trips abroad as nothing more than showmanship and PR exercises--from Tokyo to Washington and from Mongolia to Mauritius, Modi has managed reenergise India's diplomatic outreach.

Formed in 2001 as the country's first tri-services 'theatre' command, the potential of the ANC to be India's sentinel in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal was never fully understood by either the previous NDA government (during the last two years of its tenure) and then for a decade by UPA-I and UPA-II. The Vajpayee government must be credited with quickly sanctioning and creating the ANC following the report of the Group of Ministers (GoM) on Reforming National security in 2001 which had recommended ANC as a theatre command. But in its last two years, the necessary support for the Port Blair headquartered command was lacklustre. The devastating tsunami of December 2004 also created a major setback for the expansion plans.

However, despite various internal reports and assessments by both the Defence Ministry and Intelligence agencies identifying the rising presence of Chinese ships and Chinese origin fishing boats in the area overseen by the ANC, the Command did not get the attention it deserved. Closer to Indonesia than mainland India, this group of islands has been treated as an outpost for a quite some time. However, now the thinking in the Indian government at the highest levels is changing and there is a plan to use Andaman Nicobar as a spring board to south East Asia, Malacca straits and other sea lanes of communication.

A larger naval fleet including a couple of submarines and naval aviation assets is to be inducted into the ANC, recent reports have suggested. This has become necessary because of recent developments in South China Sea and the Malacca Straits. The increasing Chinese foray into the Andaman Seas is further likely to intensify once a canal is built through the vital Isthmus of Kra.

According a report in Times of India, Vice Admiral PK Chatterjee, Commander-in-Chief, Andaman Nicobar (CINCAN) has been quoted as saying: ""There are far too many interested parties and the canal through the Isthmus of Kra will certainly become a reality. Once this happens, the distance from the South China Sea to our territory will be reduced by nearly 1,300 km. The distance of the Andaman and Nicobar Island from the mainland will remain the same though. In this way, our reaction time will be comparatively reduced. I am sure that the Government of India is aware of this issue and taking necessary action. I feel things will happen."

There are about 572 islands in Andaman and Nicobar. Many of them are uninhabited and therefore tougher to guard. India needs to dominate these islands to prevent any inimical activity. Currently, frequent patrols go out to familiarise the area.Called jaan pehchaan, the patrols have the representatives from the Army, navy, coast guard, the police and forest department. The composite patrols go to different islands, stay for nights and ensure that area is intact and dominated.

Meanwhile INS ‘Baaz, a Naval Air Station established at Campbell Bay on Great Nicobar Island, in 2012 will also be upgraded with more assets. INS Baaz, about 300 nautical miles from Port Blair, is the southernmost air station of the Indian armed forces. It offers a vital geostrategic advantage to India. Not only do they provide the Nation with a commanding presence in the Bay of Bengal, the Islands also serve as our window into East and South East Asia. It also sits astride some of the busiest shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean, most carrying strategic cargo for East Asian economies.

The previously sanctioned plans to fortify infrastructure also includes establishing forward operating bases in Kamorta (Nicobar Islands) and Diglipur (Andaman) as well. India’s co-operative maritime engagement with South East Asian and East Asian countries is also being constantly enhanced through initiatives like the MILAN series of exercises, co-operative patrols with countries like Indonesia and Thailand and other Navy-to-Navy linkages with ASEAN countries as distant as Vietnam. Clearly, the ANC is now set to get the attention it deserves for keeping the Indian naval dominance in its own backyard intact.

For the past 16 years since 1999, every year, 26 July is celebrated as Vijay Diwas to commemorate the hard fought victory of the Indian Army over the intruding Pakistani forces. The battles of Tiger Hill, Tololing, Three Pimples, Munto Dhalo are still fresh in people’s minds and so are the names like Vikram Batra, Manoj Pandey, Sanjay Kumar, Yogendra Yadav—the four Param Vir Chakra winners in the Kargil conflict of 1999.

But few will have an idea or would have been told about an incredible battle that took place exactly 50 years to date right on top of the head of Kargil town. On 16-17 May 1965, Indian army troops wrested Point 13620 (called so because it is at an altitude of 13,620 feet) overlooking the Kargil town and the vital National Highway linking Srinagar to Leh.

Well-entrenched Pakistani troops at Point 13620 were constantly threatening the highway by targeting vehicular traffic plying on the National Highway (much like they did in 1999). The firing from the location was part of the overall plan that the Pakistani Army had followed since December 1964. All across the Ceasefire line (remember the old line agreed to in 1949 was renamed as LoC or Line of Control post the 1971 war), Pakistani army was indulging in intrusions, ceasefire violations and attacks on bridges and posts. Newspaper reports of the time suggest that Pakistan had started to frequently target Poonch, Chammb, Keran, Tithwal and Kargil areas, built new bunkers and brought in reinforcements from December 1964.

But President Mohd Ayub’s cabinet and especially Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto were not willing to give up their plan to create trouble in Kashmir. They had their reasons of course. In Bhutto’s assessment this was the best period to wrest back Kashmir from India. If Pakistan wanted to wrest Kashmir by armed force, Bhutto argued, 1965 was the last chance. He was sure the opportunity would vanish once the expansion and re-organisation of the Indian Army was complete in a few years time. At the opportune time, Bhutto felt, India was badly shaken by multiple factors: its humiliating defeat in the 1962 War with China, Jawaharlal Nehru’s death, his successor Lal Bahadur Shastri’s perceived ineffectual leadership, acute food shortage sweeping India and the start of a virulent anti-Hindi agitation in South India.

Bhutto’s logic did appear persuasive. Bhutto later told his biographer, Salman Taseer: “I wrote to Ayub Khan saying that if he wanted to pursue a policy of confrontation with India, time was running out. We had to act now or it was late.” So, even as the top-most decision-makers in Pakistan discussed and debated the ways to wrest Kashmir from India, the Pakistani Army stepped up its ceasefire violations and attacks from January 1965 onwards. SN Prasad and UN Thapliyal in their book, The India-Pakistan War of 1965 say as many as 1347 ceasefire violations took place between January and May 1965 as against 522 in the corresponding period the previous year!

It was against this backdrop that the 121 Independent Brigade Group, headquartered in Kargil, was faced with the task of silencing the Pakistani guns located on the utterly dominating heights of Point 13620. The 4 Rajput battalion, which had won the ‘Battle Honour Zojila’ on 15 Nov 1948 at Dras, just 64 km from Kargil, was the only Infantry battalion available to the 121 Brigade Group. The Bravo and Charlie Companies of the battalion launched a well-planned and perfectly executed counter-attack on 16-17 May and captured the well-entrenched Pakistan posts at Pt 13620 and the adjacent Black Rock peak.

The capture of Point 13620 and Black Rocks in a way proved to be morale booster for the beleaguered Indian Army reeling under the recent humiliation in the Kutch area. SN Prasad and Thapliyal write in their book: “The Kargil operation was in the nature of a counter-offensive, undertaken by Indian troops in many years. Its success gave a fillip to the troops in Jammu and Kashmir and the Army as a whole. Politically, it bolstered the image of the country.”

It’s another matter that like Haji Pir, both the political and military leadership of that time, succumbed to international pressure and returned both the peaks to Pakistan by 30 June. In yet another daring operation, Point 13620 was again recaptured in September that year only to be returned again. It was finally in 1971 that India recaptured the peak and has stayed in firm control since then.

Enhancing security on the Western Sea Board

http://www.abplive.in/author/nitingokhale/2015/05/09/article581629.ece/Enhancing-security-on-the-Western-Sea-Board1

Sat, May 9, 2015

Incredibly, despite Gujarat’s vulnerability as a frontline coastal state closest to Pakistan on the Western Sea Board, the Indian Navy’s on-shore presence in the state was so far negligible. Remember, Gujarat has the longest coastline--880 NM—in India. Besides it shares 532 Km of land border with Pakistan. With the Commissioning of INS Sardar Patel, a critical gap in Gujarat’s defence is being sought to be filled. The new base will have a couple of Indian Naval ships stationed here permanently besides a complement of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and a Dornier aircraft for reconnaissance and surveillance.

The establishment of INS Sardar Patel has not come a day soon.

FILE PIC: AFP

Consider this: In the past decade, the maritime infrastructure along the coast of Gujarat has grown manifold. Several civilian ports have come up along the coastline, which collectively handle 300 million tonnes of cargo annually. One estimate says these ports handle about 30 per cent of the total cargo handled in the ports of India. Besides, according to study, there are 12 single point moorings (SPMs) in the Gulf of Kutch, through which about 120 million tonnes of crude oil is supplied to various refineries located along the Gujarat coast and refineries slightly deeper in the hinterland. These SPMs handle over 70 per cent of India’s oil imports.

Given the strategic importance of these installations and infrastructure, Gujarat’s importance as well as its vulnerability cannot be emphasised enough. Although a small detachment of the Indian navy was available at Porbandar since 1997 and a Naval Officer In Charge (NOIC), Gujarat was posted at various locations in the state, not enough attention was given to a larger naval presence in Gujarat. However, events like the attack on Mumbai in November 2008 and recent attempts to send in hostile elements on fishing boats into Gujarat, perhaps a hastened the plans to improve Indian Navy’s ability to counter such threats along the state’s vulnerable coastline. So, during the last few years, conscious attempts have been made to increase in the Navy’s presence and operations in the North Arabian Sea and off the Gujarat coast. A ‘Defence of Gujarat’ Exercise led by the Navy along with participation of other agencies, such as Indian Coast Guard, Indian Air Force and State Authorities has been an annual feature for the past few years. These exercises have helped in enhancing coordination and bolstering the maritime security preparedness in Gujarat.

According to the Indian Navy, it has plans to base more ships in the ports of Gujarat, besides augmenting air assets at Naval Air Enclave, Porbandar. In order to ensure the security of maritime traffic plying through the Deep water Channel (DWC), off Okha and Gulf of Kutch against threats from enemy submarines/ mines, the Navy is also in the process of acquiring Shallow-Water, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) Craft and Mine Counter Measure vessels. These vessels will operate from various ports in Gujarat in the eventuality of any hostilities.

The enhanced operational tempo along the coast of Gujarat has made it imperative for the Navy to improve the infrastructure on ground. Accordingly, living quarters for its men and officers, schools, hospital, maintenance facilities for various naval assets are in the process of being built, enhanced and operationalised at Porabandar. The Gujarat government has allotted about 750 acres of land to facilitate the new Naval base in the state. As the base gets commissioned, elements of the India Navy's Western Fleet including aircraft carrier Viraat, destroyers Kolkata & Delhi, tanker Deepak, four stealth frigates, six missile boats, one OPV, two mobile missile coastal batteries and a handful fast interceptor craft lined up today outside Porbandar harbour to mark the big day.

The neighbourhood-first approach on the foreign policy front for instance; the passage of crucial bills in the insurance, coal and mining sectors for one; Bringing in a sense of realism in the defence ministry by enforcing accountability, for another. But all these not-so-insignificant achievements have been overshadowed by an inept communication strategy of the government which in itself is surprising since one of the hallmarks of the Modi campaign in the run up to the 2014 elections was direct and effective connect with the people of all ages.

But to get back to the Defence Ministry’s notification. It has named a 10-member Committee of Experts to suggest amendments to the existing Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) and formulate a new policy framework.

The terms of reference for the committee are interesting: It is mandated to a) evolve a policy framework to facilitate ‘Make in India’ in Defence Manufacturing and align the policy evolved with the DPP 2013 and b) To suggest requisite amendments to DPP 2013 to remove the bottlenecks in the procurement process and also simply/rationalise various aspects of defence procurements.

The Committee, made up of eight non-government and retired government officials and two serving bureaucrats from the Defence Ministry, has been asked to submit its recommendations within 45 days.

The committee was formed after Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, during his interactions with various stakeholders, realised that the existing system was opaque and left no room for flexibility in decision making leading to inordinate delays in crucial acquisitions. It is evident from the composition of the committee that the selection of the members has been done with careful consideration.

Headed by a former home secretary to the Government of India, Dhirendra Singh, it has experts drawn from different fields. Another IAS officer, Satish B. Agnihotri, who retired in February this year as Secretary, Coordination in the Cabinet Secretariat, had been a former Director General, Acquisition, in the Defence Ministry not very long ago. Air Marshal S. Sukumar, who retired a couple of months ago, was known as a specialist in procurement and acquisition throughout his long career in the Indian Air Force. Similarly, Lt Gen AV Subramaniam, an EME officer, recently retired as Director General, Weapons and Equipment from the Army HQ and has extensive knowledge about the obstacles in quick procurement and acquisition and so does former naval officer, Rear Adm. Pritam Lal, who too specialised in this segment at the Naval HQ.

An ex DRDO Scientist, Pralhada, retired Colonel KV Kuber, who has worked extensively with the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) over the past decade and Sujit Hardas, Deputy Director General of the CII’s Defence wing, make up the non-government component of the committee. Two serving Joint Secretaries, Sanjay Garg and Subir Mallick are expected to give the government’s inputs on issues that will come up before the committee.

The Committee is likely to consider many aspects that dog India’s cumbersome acquisition process through a consultative process and come up with a user-friendly policy.

Some of the more pressing issues that the Defence Ministry is keen to resolve quickly are the question of appointment of ‘legal’ or authorised agents by defence firms and the policy of blanket blacklisting of manufacturers. The Ministry wants to use the power to ban a firm only in the rarest case. The previous government had indiscriminately blacklisted over a dozen firms, severely restricting the options of the forces to source equipment. Similarly, by legalising agents, the ministry wants to bring in a degree of transparency in the interaction between defence manufacturers and government officials. Currently, representatives of different firms--legal or otherwise--operate clandestinely since the legal position is unclear.

Given that many such changes are overdue in the Defence Ministry, the recommendations of the experts committee will surely be watched keenly across the defence sector.

Sunday, May 10, 2015

Lt Col Prasad Purohit: Victim of circumstances or all-round conspiracy?

On 15 April 2015, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court said in its order after hearing a bail application of Lt Col Prasad Purohit, the Indian Army Officer, accused of being involved in a bomb blast in Malegaon: "Since the occurrence is of the year 2008 and nearly seven years have gone by, it is imperative that the Special Court commence the trial at the earliest and conclude the same expeditiously. We direct the Prosecuting Agency to ensure that the necessary evidence i.e. oral, documentary as well as other form of evidence placed before the Court to enable the Special Court to commence the trial early and conclude the same expeditiously. It is stated that no officer has been posted for the Special Court as on date. We, therefore, request the Chief Justice of the High Court of Bombay to pass appropriate orders either for posting these cases before a learned Judge by way of special order or appoint a Presiding Officer exclusively for deciding these cases in order to ensure speedy trial. We also direct the Presiding Officer of the Special Court to dispose of the bail applications expeditiously, preferably within one month from the date of his/her assumption of Office as Special Judge. The Registry is directed to transmit the records forthwith."

Nearly a month has passed since then but why the Bombay High Court is yet to move on the 'request' made by the Supreme Court is anybody's guess. In fact, Purohit's wife made an application the very next day to the Bombay High Court to post a Special Judge and hear the matter immediately.

But why blame the Bombay High Court alone. For seven years, Purohit's strong-willed but soft-spoken wife Aparna has gone from pillar to post to get a fair trial for her husband, still a serving Lt. Col in the Indian Army. She has however failed to get any hearing, leave alone justice.

For nearly seven years he has been in jail as an under-trial under the stringent MCOCA (Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act) for the alleged crime of having masterminded the Malegaon bomb blasts on 29 September 2008. The investigation of these blasts was initially handled by the Maharashtra ATS (Anti-Terrorism Squad). However, despite the NIA (National Investigation Agency) taking over the Malegaon blast case for investigation in April 2011, it is yet to file a charge sheet against Purohit.

The entire episode--like many other cases in this country--reeks of timidity, criminal negligence, apathy and above all indifference on part of almost everyone involved in law enforcement and criminal justice system (read a detailed account of the Purohit case here: (http://www.manushi.in/articles.php?articleId=1803&ptype=#.VU8evY6qqko)

It also shows up the Indian Army--which prides itself on speedy justice--in poor light since its successive leadership from the time of his arrest had failed to give justice to a fellow officer. Indeed, it's a matter of shame that a rogue, over-ambitious Military Intelligence Officer was allowed to take law into his own hands and victimise Col Purohit (for details of the case and the circumstances under which Purohit was arrested and tortured inhumanly read this: (http://nitinagokhale.blogspot.in/2012/06/purohit-case-maze-of-confusion.html).

Meanwhile simultaneously there was a Court of Inquiry held by the Army against Col. Purohit. Over 50 officers and men were called upon as witness. All of them came out in support of the accused officer (http://nitinagokhale.blogspot.in/2012/06/what-fellow-officers-said-about-lt-col.html). Perhaps surprised, the authorities never proceeded further in the case.

There is more. For nearly three years from 2012, each time the Supreme Court gave a date for hearing Purohit's bail plea, the case got postponed several times and appeal for bail was pending in the apex court for more than 18 months. It was not until 15 April this year that the case was heard. The order was passed that the trial be heard expeditiously and the matter disposed of within a month. As of 10 May, there is no indication if a Judge will be nominated to hear the case. Please note that actor Salman Khan's bail application was listed in the same High Court in next to no time.

Having been arrested and kept in jail for seven years, Col Purohit will have to face the law and go through the process to get justice to prove himself innocent but when the wheels of justice grind oh ever so slowly, one begins to wonder if he is just a victim of circumstances or of a larger conspiracy.

Wednesday, May 6, 2015

An overview of the Defence Ministry in April

1. http://nitinagokhale.blogspot.in/2015/04/cut-your-coat-according-to-your-cloth.html

2. http://www.abplive.in/author/nitingokhale/2015/05/02/article574902.ece/Experts-to-suggest-simplified-defence-acquisitions

3. http://www.abplive.in/author/nitingokhale/2015/04/19/article561637.ece/Procrastination-is-no-longer-a-default-option

4. http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/standpoint-improvement-of-border-roads-is-non-negotiable-2082514

5. http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/standpoint-perform-or-perish-is-the-new-mantra-in-the-defence-ministry-2078241

6. http://nitinagokhale.blogspot.in/2015/04/fiscal-reality-truncates-mountain.html

Monday, May 4, 2015

Tyranny of distance or sheer indifference? Why we under report North-east India?

The killing of 8 security personnel -- seven Assam Rifles soldiers and one jawan of a Territorial Army unit -- in Nagaland's Mon district on Sunday morning made it to India's television screens almost 12 hours after it occurred, once again demonstrating the low priority one of India's most important regions occupies in the mind space of our so-called 'national media.'

As someone who has worked as a journalist both in the North-East and in Delhi (more in the North-East than in Delhi, of course), the feeling of being neglected is familiar. But in previous decades there was at least a valid excuse of poor communication and connectivity in not giving importance to the events and happenings in the North-East. News travelled slowly in those days and the full picture of an encounter or an ambush usually emerged only 24 hours later.

In today's day and age there is no such fig leaf available. Telephone and mobile connectivity to the seven states of the North-East is as good or bad as other parts of the country. So what explains the absence of North-East news -- good, bad or ugly -- in the metropolitan media?

Television ratings? Sure.

Lack of information on the region that is far removed from the cities? Definitely.

But more than anything else, it is the lack of the 'sexy' news quotient in the events that happen in the region that prevents decision-makers (or managers) in news organisations from giving any substantial space to news from the North-East.

Imagine if eight soldiers had been killed in Kashmir. Or in Chhattisgarh. Television news would have gone over the top, breathless reporting would have given us running commentary on how the security personnel were caught napping, how SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) were not followed and how daring the attack was by the militants/terrorists.

The next day's newspapers would have had map graphics pinpointing the location, box items listing out previous instances of such ambushes. In short, the killing would have made big headlines.

By contrast, Sunday's ambush in Mon (where's that?) district got only perfunctory mention. I doubt if there will be any follow up on how and why it happened. Nearly 24 hours after it occurred, in Delhi we are not aware if the ambush was one-off or is part of a larger game plan?

The details -- that initially a water bowser of the Assam Rifles was attacked, the driver and co-driver were killed, followed by an ambush of the Quick Reaction Team (QRT) which went looking for the water bowser led to more killings -- have largely gone unreported.

We do not know for instance that the group believed to be responsible for the attack -- the NSCN(K) or the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Khaplang group -- is no longer in a ceasefire mode with the Government of India.

News managers in Delhi will, of course, cite the usual excuses: 'Oh it happened in a remote part of the region'; 'No one is interested in what's happening in those areas'; and the oft-cited one; 'the tyranny of distance prevents us from focussing on the region.' I have heard them often enough in the past three decades. But these reasons are no longer valid.

There is no dearth of stringers (part-time reporters) from these states any more. The North-East has a vibrant media presence and there are enough well-informed and responsible journalists in the region to give accurate and timely inputs. But all that is of no use if those in charge of putting out news have zero interest in the region.

The sad truth is our news managers know much more about Houston and Boston than Kohima and Kokrajhar. Most of them will have the latest information about the elections in the UK, but will be clueless on the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution and its application in the region.

Worse still, many worthies will travel to the US and Europe to report on Prime Minister Modi's foreign sojourns but will cite the difficulties of logistics when asked why they don't cover Modi's forays into Arunachal Pradesh, a state China lays claim to.

If such big events in the North-East are under-reported, why should anyone expect the killing of seven or eight poor security personnel to get any substantial coverage? As someone who owes a large part of his career to the North-East, the least I could have done is to raise the issue again irrespective of the outcome.

http://www.rediff.com/news/column/did-you-know-8-soldiers-were-killed-on-sunday/20150504.htm

NewsWarrior