From my scrapbook: An interview with Atal Behari Vajpayee in 1985!

Look what I found in my scrapbook!! An interview with Atal Behari Vajpayee circa 1985!

He was visiting Guwahati in the immediate aftermath of the Lok Sabha elections in December 1984. 

The BJP was down to 2 seats in the Lok Sabha. He himself was defeated by the young and dashing Madhavrao Scindia. As a young upstart reporter (less than two years in journalism) when I asked him to analyse the result of the Lok Sabha results, he was candid enough to admit that Opposition lost because in Mrs Gandhi's assassination, it had lost the prime target of criticism!

Now 29 years later, when I look back, I laugh at my own naivety! 

I asked him as the last question (see below): What is the role of RSS in the BJP? 

His answer: "The RSS has no role to play in the BJP." 

Time to look at US as India's major strategic challenge

In the standard national security narrative that all of us contribute to, the usual instinct is to concentrate on two or three of India's major strategic challenges: the rise of China and New Delhi's past experience with Beijing; the ever present shadow of Pakistan and India's diminishing clout in the immediate neighbourhood.

Most of us continue to mainly write, discuss, analyse and criticise India's policy on these three issues but of late, I have had this nagging feeling that in the fog of information overload, we are somewhere losing sight of the threat posed to India by the United States of America and its approach to the rapidly changing geopolitics in Asia-Pacific.

Yes, you read right.I am indeed talking about US policies turning out to be India's major headache in the near future.

And no, this has nothing to do with the Devayani Khobgragade-Sangeeta Richard affair in New York.

Three or four recent developments in India's strategic neighbourhood in which the US has a role to play should raise alarm in New Delhi.

For over a decade, India has invested its goodwill, funds and manpower in strengthening an anti-Taliban regime in Kabul. Although it has so far refrained from supplying lethal military hardware, despite repeated pleas by Hamid Karzai, India has done everything else possible to help anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. All that work is threatening to come undone now because Washington is in a hurry to exit from a war it no longer has stomach to fight. In the process, it is willing to bring the very forces it sought to keep out and entered Afghanistan in the first place.

Attempts to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate the Taliban in a post-2014 arrangement is one of the main proposals in the High Peace Council proposal called 'A Road Map for 2015.'  So far so good. But when the plan goes on to talk about the next step--that of giving the Taliban positions in 'the power structure of the state such as ministerial berths and governors' posts--the magnitude of the problem becomes apparent. There is more. The 'Road Map' gives Pakistan  a predominant and controlling stake in the proposed peace process, virtually institutionalising Rawalpindi's role in the post-2014 scenario. And all this with American blessings.

This plan to outsource Afghanistan to Pakistan under the guise of ensuring stability in the region not only ignores the Afghan anger at Washington but more importantly shows up the lack of importance that  Washington attaches to New Delhi in South Asia. The fact is, any return of the Taliban in Kabul is bad news for India and US is not doing anything to prevent it despite professing to have India's interests at heart in the new-found bonhomie between the two in the past decade.

There are also straws in the wind indicating revived attempts by influential voices in Washington pushing the old Pakistani line that stability in South Asia can be achieved only if India and Pakistan resolve Kashmir quickly. The proponents of this line are sold on the idea pushed by Islamabad that it can step up and play a role in stabilising the Af-Pak region only if negotiations on Kashmir involve other regional players like Saudi Arabia and China, even if indirectly.

India must also be looking at the rapprochement between the US and Iran with some concern. Its been a lose-lose situation for New Delhi.When Washington and Tehran were on opposite sides, New Delhi dared not get too close to Iran for fear of annoying the US. Now, with the US likely to cosy up to Iran, the prospects of India's role in the Persian Gulf  getting marginalised further look real.

The third and final factor that should worry New Delhi is Washington's recent contradictory and timid response to China imposing the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over East China Sea. The US reluctance to confront Beijing on behalf of long-term ally Japan would have given India an idea how not to depend on Washington in times of crisis against China. Fortunately in this respect, India has stoutly resisted US overtures to align against Beijing.

Then there are niggling issues like the two sides finding themselves at odds in dealing with the fluid situation in Bangladesh. India believes that it needs to continue backing the Sheikh Hasina led Awami League in Bangladesh but Washington is openly hobnobbing with the Jamaat, seen as pro-Pakistan.

India and US have, since 2001, rebooted their relationship both in the areas of trade and even defence. That India has bought military platforms worth over 8 billion dollars from the US--the latest clearance to buy additional six C-130 J medium lift transport aircraft came as recently as three days ago--should not detract from the fact that New Delhi and Washington have drifted apart in recent months.

This is quite a change from the situation even two years ago.

As 2013 draws to an end, it is disconcerting to note that India's strategic challenge in South Asia comes not only from its traditional adversaries Pakistan and China but also from the US.

Politically weak govt, a staus quoist defence minister. Hopes for Indian Defence Reforms fade

(http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/hopes-for-indian-defense-reform-fade/)

Government reversals at the polls are likely to see task force recommendations put on the backburner.

The rout of the ruling Congress party in four recent provincial elections, including one in the national capital of Delhi, has effectively put paid to any hopes that defense reforms will proceed any time soon in India.

Even at the best of times, the government headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, now in the last six months of its second term, has been reluctant to alter the country’s defense management architecture.

Now, with the Congress party’s moral and political authority further weakened after the severe electoral setback, Singh and his status quoist Defense Minister AK Antony are likely to put recent recommendations by a veteran group of strategic thinkers and former government bureaucrats permanently in cold storage, despite a half-hearted attempt to kickstart the process a month ago.

The Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security, given the mission of recommending changes in national security apparatus, submitted its report in 2012. More than a year later, in October this year, the Chiefs of StaffCommittee (CoSC), comprising India’s three service chiefs, came up with a blueprint for implementing some of the main recommendations in the Task Force report and sent it to the Prime Minister’s Office for a final decision.

The expectation was that by early 2014, if not by end of this year, the prime minister would restructure India’s forces to meet the mounting challenges in India’s near abroad and extended neighborhood.

The recommendations are not radical. They include appointing a four-star permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff for a fixed tenure of two years; creating three more tri-service commands: Special Operations, Cyber and Aerospace; and reverting the Andaman Nicobar Command to the Indian Navy.

Creation of the three new commands was deemed necessary to generate more synergy among the three services, seen as largely working in separate verticals. Although the new commands may take some time to become operational, actually setting them up was considered doable in the short term. According to the available details, the proposed cyber command is to be headed by a three-star officer drawn from either of the three services by rotation, the special operations command is to be led by the army, while the aerospace command would be headed by an air force officer.

The task force proposed returning the Andaman Nicobar Command – considered India’s springboard into East Asia and the South China Sea – to the Navy after more than a decade of treating it as a tri-service command. In contrast, the status of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) – custodian of India’s nuclear arsenal – is to remain unaltered.

The biggest sticking point apparently is the appointment of a four-star general or equivalent ranked officer from the Air Force or the Navy, who would act as an interlocutor with the political executive. To be called Permanent Chairman, CoSC, this officer would be a substitute for a long pending demand for a full-fledged five-star Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) along the lines of those in the U.S., U.K. or Australia, to act as a single point military adviser to the government.

Since the appointment of a CDS has been a major bone of contention between the Army and the Indian Air Force – with past experience weighing heavily – successive governments have shied away from going down that road. Appointment of a permanent chairman is believed to be a step short of appointing a CDS.

Based on some of the occasional interaction that this author has had with members of the Task Force, before and after the submission of the report, one aspect is very clear: There was no consensus on the creation of the post of the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), and this is what prompted the recommendation to appoint another four-star officer as permanent chairman of the CoSC.

Under the recommendation of the Naresh Chandra Task Force, the permanent chairman would have a fixed tenure of two years and would be rotated among the three services. The officer will be assisted by the existing Integrated Defense Staff (IDS), headed by a three-star officer from any of the three services.

Over the past decade, the IDS has evolved into a barely workable tri-services structure with more than 300 officers drawn from the three services trying to function as a cohesive unit tasked with evolving “jointness.” On the ground however, jointness or inter-operability has remained patchy, at best.

The new post, the Task Force is hoping, will also bring synergy in major acquisitions for all the three forces. Often, the three services have worked independently in procuring same set of equipment, duplicating work and creating separate infrastructure when synergy would have saved billions of rupees.

However, critics of the new system say the recommendation to appoint a permanent chairman is simply old wine in a new bottle. It is seen as a non-starter because the chairman will remain ever dependent on each of the services for its personnel requirements. Personnel from each service will be lobbyists for their respective chiefs. Yet another opportunity, these critics say, to reform has been lost. The National Security System does not have to depend on seeking lowest common multiple solutions. It does not have to seek to appease lobbies and turfs.

However, many of the other recommendations of the Naresh Chandra Task Force would bring much-needed vigor to the management of India’s defense forces, and improvements in civil-military relations. From what is known, the task force had also sought integration of the Service HQ and Ministry of Defense by allowing more cross-postings, suggested shifting the focus of India’s national security strategy from Pakistan to China, recommended better Intelligence Coordination among agencies, and proposed the creation of dedicated financial Institution for access to energy, rare earths and raw materials from across the world.

This new structure could have been a major step in breaking the status quo in the country’s higher defense management. However the establishment in New Delhi is loathe to embrace change. Given the uncertain political climate, overcoming this resistance seems a tall order.

Why military diplomacy needs bigger role in India

Military literature in India often is limited to focusing on operations undertaken by men and women in uniform. Rarely does it analyse or weave in the civil or diplomatic decisions that dictate military action. The absence of a wholesome narrative is perhaps symptomatic of the deep suspicion that hangs over relations between the civil and military bureaucracy. Gen VP Malik's latest book India's Military Conflicts and Diplomacy: An Inside view of Decision Making, gives us a peep into how the military gets roped in or left out in important national decisions, depending on who is at the helm. It is an insiders account and not a ringside view.

As India's Army Chief for three years (1997-2000)--the 1998 nuclear tests and Kargil conflict happened on his watch--Gen Malik had been part of India's highest decision-making apparatus on security and defence. But even before he became the Army Chief, he was involved in and witness to some momentous events that needed India's military intervention in the immediate neighbourhood.

When in 1988 Maldivian President Abdul Gayoom was under siege from rebels determined to overthrow him in Male, Indian armed forces created history by successfully capturing the mercenaries and the rebel leader after flying 3,000 km from Agra to Male! All the three forces--Army, navy air force--contributed to the smooth conduct of an unprecedented operation. But very little is known about the way India's politico-diplomatic leadership of the time reacted to the situation. The book fills that gap.

As Gen Malik writes: "While the military operation, a part of the mission, was witnessed and discussed widely all over the world, not many people are aware of the drama that took place at the highest level of the government before the concerned political, military and civilian leadership worked out a joint plan for the intervention.The single most factor for our success in the operation was the speed at which it was decided, planned and executed jointly by the armed forces...unfortunately, many of these lessons have been lost at the political and bureaucratic levels. This has happened primarily because no one prepared a complete report on the decision making process, planning and coordination in any of the different ministries or service headquarters of the government."

There have been numerous debates about the condition of the country's higher defence management apparatus. Instead of evolving into a seamless structure in the six decades since Independence, it has in my view degenerated into a disjointed, fractious entity with ad hoc appendages getting added on to existing mechanisms further muddying the waters. Gen Malik has taken examples of India's military-diplomatic forays in recent decades to illustrate the need for improvement in higher defence management of  the country. Operation Pawan, India's disastrous military intervention on Sri Lanka under Rajiv Gandhi and Gen K. Sundarji is analysed in some detail and so is Operation Shakti, India's successful nuclear tests in 1998.However for me, one of the bonus of this book is the insight provided by Gen Malik on Operation Khukri, India's peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone, the West African country under a UN mandate. It is one of the best examples of successful military-diplomatic-political intervention.

If foreign and defence policies are considered two sides of the same coin, as Gen Malik writes, then it is incumbent upon both the defence and external affairs ministries to have a certain level of trust, confidence and understanding. That cooperation, despite occasional successes, remains a chimera in Indian context. Very often, the Indian military's advice is at variance with India's diplomatic stand. India's recent engagements in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh and the mess that New Delhi finds itself in some of these countries is, in my view, result of the two ministries working in independent verticals.

Gen Malik's book, his second after the one exclusive focused on the 1999 Kargil conflict, is an important work simply because a former military chief has highlighted the shortcomings in the diplomatic-military synergy. His aim is to draw lessons from India's own experience in these matters. Written in a easy-to-understand manner and peppered with several anecdotes many of us remember hearing about, the book is a must read for students of military history. Gen Malik also has first hand account from many of the main players involved in some of these operations. As a former Army Chief, he of course has the advantage of knowing and working with many of them!

Gen Malik concludes: "Given today's rapidly changing geo-strategic environment, it is imperative that we change our mindset and attitude and look beyond narrow boundaries defined by 'turf' and parochialism. Politico-military strategy is too vital a subject to be dealt with in watertight compartments. We need to re-engineer our national security paradigm and defence management structure and processes to make them more holistic and broad based. Only then can we be fully prepared to take on the role that we see for ourselves in the global community..." In short military diplomacy is needed to be taken more seriously.

That however, as the former Army Chief himself knows, is a tall order, at least in the foreseeable future. And that is the tragedy of India, a wannabe regional, if not a global power!

ADIZ is a zone of safety, not risks, a zone of cooperation, not competition, says China

East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (Source: Ministry of National Defense/China Daily)

BEIJING, Dec. 3 (Xinhua) -- Following is a statement made by Geng Yansheng, spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, on China's establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ):

The Chinese government announced the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone on Nov. 23, 2013. It is a necessary measure for China to protect its state sovereignty and territorial and airspace security. It is conducive to maintaining flying safety in international airspace, and is in line with international laws and conventions. The announcement of the East China Sea ADIZ has earned understanding and recognition from an increasing number of countries and peoples, but misunderstandings or even distortions also exist. Representing the Chinese Defense Ministry, I make some interpretations on some issues that the outside world is concerned about.

Some people take the ADIZ to be a territorial airspace by falsely saying that China violates other countries' interests; some equate the ADIZ with a no-fly zone, accusing China of severely undermining the freedom of overflight. Both statements are incorrect. An ADIZ is essentially different from territorial airspace or no-fly zones. It is not a country's territorial airspace, but an international airspace demarcated outside the territorial airspace for the purpose of identification and early warning; it is not a no-fly zone, and will not affect the freedom of overflight, based on international laws, of other countries' aircraft. According to international practice, a country can identify and verify aircraft entering its ADIZ. China's ADIZ was established to set aside enough time for early warning to defend the country's airspace, with defense acting as the key point. The zone does not aim at any specific country or target, nor does it constitute a threat to any country or region.

Some people doubt China's monitoring capabilities in the East China Sea ADIZ. The Chinese military's determination and volition to safeguard the security of national territory and territorial airspace are unwavering, and the military is fully capable of exercising effective control over the East China Sea ADIZ. Generally, supervision and control are exercised through reported flight plans and radar response and identification, among other means. Military planes can also take flight if necessary to identify entering targets. Measures to be taken are based on factors such as an entering aircraft's attributes -- military or civilian, the extent of threat, or distance. Fighter planes are unnecessary when an entering aircraft is found to pose no threat to us, but necessary surveillance is needed; when the entering threat is ascertained to reach a certain extent, military aircraft will be mobilized at an appropriate time to dispose of the situation. It is well-known that civil flights pose no threat in most circumstances. China always respects other countries' freedom of overflight according to international laws, so that international flights that fly normally within the rules in the East China Sea ADIZ will not be affected, as such is the fact.

Some people say that China's requirement of reporting flight plans is unusual, and a very few countries have even pressured their civil aviation companies and demanded that they should not report flight plans to China. There is no unified international rule as to how to ask other countries to report flight plans to the ADIZ demarcators. Many countries require aircraft flying over their air defense identification zones to report flight plans beforehand. China is not special in doing so. Actually, since the announcement of the East China Sea ADIZ, a majority of civil aviation companies with their air routes traversing the area have reported flight plans to China's civil aviation department, including some airlines of Japan. We have also noticed that some countries' military planes took it seriously after China's announcement of the East China Sea ADIZ. China's requirement of reporting flight plans and relevant information is conducive to ensuring flight safety and avoiding misunderstanding and misjudgment, considering heavy air traffic in airspace over the East China Sea. A very few countries' insistence on not reporting flight plans is not beneficial, nor responsible.

We have noticed that a very few countries have said that China's setting up of the East China Sea ADIZ has unilaterally altered the East China Sea's status quo, and escalated regional tension. The fact is that they established an ADIZ as early as 1969 and later expanded its scope many times to only 130 km toward our coastline from its west end, which covers most of the airspace of the East China Sea, so they are not qualified at all to make irresponsible remarks on China's lawful and rational act. Since September 2012, Japan has been making trouble over territorial disputes, staging a farce by announcing that it would "purchase" the Diaoyu Islands, frequently sending vessels and planes to disturb Chinese ships and planes in normal exercises or training, openly making provocative remarks such as shooting down Chinese drones, playing up the so-called China threat, escalating regional tension, creating excuses for revising its current constitution and expanding its military, trying to deny the result of the World War II, and refusing to implement the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. Japan's actions have seriously harmed China's legitimate rights and security interests, and undermined the peace and stability in east Asia. China has to take necessary reactions. A very few countries must earnestly reflect on their actions and correct their wrong remarks and wrongdoings. Other parties concerned should also mind their words and actions, and should not do things to undermine regional stability and bilateral relations. Other parties should not be incited, or send wrong signals to make a very few countries go further on the wrong track, which will follow the same old disastrous road and undermine regional and world peace.

China unswervingly adheres to the road of peaceful development and a defensive national defense policy. The East China Sea ADIZ is a zone of safety, not risks, a zone of cooperation, not competition. We are willing to conduct active communication and consultation with relevant parties to jointly safeguard flight safety and promote peace, stability and development in the Asia-Pacific region.

Will the CCS bite the bullet?

More than a year after the Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security submitted its report to the Prime Minister, one is hearing of a forward movement towards implementation of some of its recommendations. Although the report has not been made public--contrary to the earlier promise--the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC), comprising the 3 Service Chiefs, has worked out a blueprint for a new higher defence management structure for the armed forces and sent it to the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) last month. 

Even the Technical Coordination Group (TCG), headed by the National Security Adviser and comprising top secretaries to the Government of India (GoI) has reportedly cleared the proposal for presentation to the Cabinet Committee on Security(CCS), the country's highest decision making body on matters of defence and security. It is anybody's guess however if--not when--the CoSC proposals would be put up for the consideration of CCS! For, ultimately, this new structure would be a major step in breaking the status quo in the country's higher defence management and the 'deep establishment' in New Delhi is loathe to change. The question is: can the CCS overcome resistance from the well-entrenched bureaucracy and bite the bullet? 

Even as we await that decision, this is what has the CoSC proposed. According to sources in the know, the plan mainly is to:

• Appoint a 4-star permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff for a fixed tenure of two years
• Create three more tri-service commands--Special Operations, Cyber and Aerospace.
• Revert the Andaman Nicobar Command to the Navy

Creation of the three commands may take some time but is doable in short term. According to available details, the proposed cyber command will be headed by officers from the three services by rotation but special operations command will be led by the army but assisted by the air force and the navy while the aerospace command would be headed by an air force officer to be assisted by officers from the other two services. The ANC is proposed to be the Navy's 4th Command. The status of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC)--custodian of India's nuclear arsenal--will however remain unaltered. 

The biggest sticking point apparently is appointment of the Chairman Chiefs of Staff since it would involve shifting one of the three current service chiefs to that post at the very least. However, given that the political leadership is preoccupied and weakened, it is unlikely that the proposal will get to the CCS in the current government's tenure. Which is a pity since many of the other recommendations of the Naresh Chandra Task Force--when implemented--would bring in the much needed vigour in management of India's defence forces. From what we know, it had also asked for integration of Service HQ and Ministry of Defence by allowing more cross-postings, had suggested shifting focus of India's national security strategy from Pakistan to China, recommended better Intelligence Coordination between all agencies and creation of dedicated financial Institution for access to energy, rare earths and raw materials from across the world.

From some of the occasional interaction that this author has had with a few members of the Task Force, before and after the submission of the report, one aspect is very clear: There was no consensus on the creation of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), leading to recommendation to appoint another four-star officer as permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC).

The Permanent Chairmam according to the recommendation of the Naresh Chandra Task Force, will have a fixed tenure of two years and will be rotated among the three services. This officer will be assisted by the existing Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), headed by a three star officer from any of the three services.

Over the past decade, the IDS has evolved in a barely workable tri-services structure with over 300 officers drawn from the three services trying to function as a cohesive unit tasked with evolving "jointness." On ground however, jointness or inter-operability has remained at best patchy.

The new post, the Task Force is hoping, will also bring in synergy in major acquisitions for all the three forces. Often, the three services have worked independently in procuring same set of equipment, duplicating work and creating separate infrastructure when synergy would have saved hundreds of crores of rupees.

However, critics of the new system say the recommendation to appoint Chairman CoSC is nothing but old wine in new bottle. It is a 'no go' because the Chairman will remain ever dependent on each of the services Army, Navy & IAF for its personnel requirements. Personnel of each service will be 'lobbyists' of respective Chiefs. Yet another opportunity, they say, to reform has been lost. National Security System does not have to depend on seeking Least Common Multiple (LCM)-solutions. It does not have to seek to appease lobbies and turfs.

The solution, some in service officers say, lies in divesting the three Chiefs of operational command of forces. Let them be Chiefs of respective Staff - 'resource providers to joint operational/ strategic commands' - content with recruiting, training of personnel; holding and maintaining equipment; and executing related administrative functions.

Appointment of CDS is however the prerogative of the apex political authority, namely the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). It can choose from panel of names forwarded by the three Services. There should be no rotation to appease services. Choice of apex political authority has to be final.

In absence of a common meeting ground on deciding to appoint a CDS, the Naresh Chandra Task Force recommendation can however be utilised in the interim in creating more cohesion among the services. For instance, the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, who will have a fixed two year tenure can be made in charge of making net assessment about the strengths and weaknesses of India’s adversaries—China and Pakistan—in a holistic manner, taking into consideration inputs from all the three services and cross-referencing those inputs with other agencies like the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and RAW. Currently, the three services send their individual assessments just to complete formalities to the IDS where it remains buried in files that never see the light of the day.

Over a decade after a CDS was recommended by the Group of Ministers (GoM) in the wake of the Kargil conflict, there is no unanimity on that issue yet. Given the strong differences within the services as well as in the political class, could this be the best arrangement for now? Or is it too impractical?

To find the right answers the government should have made the Naresh Chandra Task Force report public and let a healthy debate ensue.

India's Emerging Blue-Water Navy

My latest piece in The Diplomat

(http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/indias-emerging-blue-water-navy/2/)

On November 16, the Indian Navy finally took delivery of aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, formerly the Adm. Gorshkov, at Sevmash Shipyard in northern Russia's Severodvinsk town. The acquisition marks a new phase in India’s quest to become a true blue-water navy.

The handover ceremony of the 44,570-tonne carrier is sure to have generated more than a passing interest within the PLA Navy and across the rest of the continent, since India will be the only country in Asia to have two aircraft carriers in its fleet. Admittedly, the 55-year old INS Viraat is “long in the tooth” as India's Navy Chief Admiral D. K. Joshi himself described it in a recent interview, but it will continue to operate until India's locally built carrier INS Vikrant becomes operational by 2017. 

At the moment, only the U.S. Navy brings that sort of capability to Asia. Although it is coming five years late – the original delivery was scheduled for 2008 – the Vikramaditya will give India the ability to project raw naval power in its “near abroad” as well as in its extended neighborhood. With a capacity to carry two dozen Mig-29 K fighter jets and 10 Kamov helicopters at any given time on board and fitted with the latest sensors and missiles, the brand-new aircraft carrier will boost the Indian Navy's firepower significantly.

But the Vikramaditya is not the only reason why the Indian Navy feels upbeat about its future capabilities. Naval aviation, long treated as a poor cousin of surface combatants in the Indian Navy, is exhibiting some new chutzpah of late. Days before Defence Minister AK Antony and flew to Russia with Joshi, the nation’s Defence Acquisition Council approved the purchase of four more Boeing P8I maritime patrol and antisubmarine aircraft in addition to the eight already contracted. The first of these eight planes was in fact parked at INS Dega airfield for everyone to see when Joshi formally inducted the newly acquired Advanced Jet Trainers Hawks into the Navy, to take training of Naval fighter pilots to the next level. The second P8I landed in India on November 15.

INS Dega, a small air station under Eastern Naval Command, is set to become Indian Navy's biggest air base on the eastern seaboard soon. The expansion of air assets in the East is just one of the several plans that the Indian Navy has unveiled to strengthen its presence in the Bay of Bengal and support India's “Look East Policy.” The P8Is are set to replace the hardy but old Soviet-made Tu-142 M aircraft that have been the backbone of the navy's long range maritime patrols – with flights lasting up to 16 hours at a stretch. The P8Is are expected to play a major role in the Navy's  surveillance role in the Indian Ocean as well as Malacca Straits.

As Joshi told this writer in an interview for Indian broadcaster NDTV on board INS Jalashwa, the navy's biggest amphibious ship: "The first P8I has already arrived and is in the process of being accepted. Various acceptance trials are in progress and by the end of the year we will have three of them and others following in quick order next year. That brings into this region a capability that has not existed before. It’s a brand-new aircraft, apart from the platform which in any case is a proven Boeing aircraft. The fit has been to the specification the US Navy currently has. So therefore the capabilities that are coming into our hands are absolutely state of the art."

Another capability the Indian Navy quietly added earlier this year was a dedicated communication satellite for its exclusive use. The satellite is expected to fully stabilize by the end of December. Launched with the help of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), the naval satellite is described as a force multiplier by senior naval officers. It covers the Navy's entire area of interest in the Indian Ocean and beyond. The satellite handles all data transfers for maritime domain awareness and the entire range of communications and networking needs of the Indian Navy. "It brings an entirely new dimension in network operations and in maritime operations," Joshi told this writer a fortnight ago, speaking about the satellite for the first time in the public domain.

In fact, but for an accident on board a refitted conventional submarine, INS Sindhurakshak that killed 18 sailors and sank the boat after an unexplained explosion in Mumbai harbor, the Indian Navy could have celebrated 2013 as one of its most significant years in terms of ramping up its capabilities. For instance, the nuclear reactor on India's first locally built nuclear-powered submarine, the INS Arihant went “critical” in August, marking a major milestone in India's effort to acquire a credible nuclear triad. One more year of sea trials will allow the Arihant to become operational by the end of 2014. With at least three more locally manufactured nuclear submarines in the pipeline, the Navy is hoping to overcome one obvious weakness in its arsenal: depleting submarine strength.

 The force levels of conventional submarines is down to the single digits and with delivery schedules for two building projects running way behind time, naval headquarters is naturally worried about its submarine arm. Joshi admitted as much: "Submarine-force levels I agree with you are under strain," he said, not wanting to sound too alarmist. He also hastened to add that by 2017-18 the two major submarine building projects will be back on track.

The big picture is indeed positive for the Indian Navy. Its long-term Maritime Capabilities Perspective Plan had identified a mix of two major roles for the force: One, the traditional blue water operational capability and two, a plan to effectively counter threats closer to the coast. It is steadily working towards achieving that objective.

In April 2012 a new naval base, INS Dweeprakshak (Island Protector) was put into operation at Kavaratti in Lakshawadeep, the tiny island chain, southwest of mainland India. Although the Indian Navy has had a small presence on the strategically important islands for the past decade, its decision to open a permanent base emanated from recent incidents of piracy very close to these islands. The Navy has captured at least 100 pirates and foiled several piracy attempts in this area in recent times.

The Navy is also in the process of setting up Operational Turn Around (OTR) bases, Forward Operating Bases and Naval Air Enclaves along the coast, which would enhance the reach and sustainability of its surveillance effort on both the coasts. In 2011, the Navy focused on creating operational and administrative infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Lakshadweep and Minicoy Islands, considered the country's strategic outposts.

Given the extensive plans presented to parliament, it is evident now that the Indian Navy is in the midst of its most ambitious expansion plan in the past three decades. Senior officers point out that the Indian Navy's perspective-planning in terms of force-levels is now driven by a conceptual shift from numbers of platforms – that is, from the old bean-counting philosophy – to one that concentrates on capabilities.

As the Indian Navy Chief pointed out in our interview: "The navy has great reach and sustenance. Long sea legs. We can reach out to distant waters, and sustain ourselves, bring our combat potential to where it is so required." With strategic planners predicting future conflicts in the Indo-Pacific, the Indian Navy's rising profile will be keenly watched across the region and beyond.