This is what I wrote for India Abroad magazine: (http://www.indiaabroad-digital.com/indiaabroad/20160610?pg=46#pg46 and http://www.indiaabroad-digital.com/indiaabroad/20160610?pg=50#pg50
Admiral Harry Harris, the Commander of the
Honolulu-headquartered US Pacific Command is a blunt man. As a military leader
who reckons China poses the greatest threat to world peace in today’s context
because of its reckless actions in East and South China Seas, Adm. Harris
doesn’t pull punches when it comes to commenting on China’s ‘adventurism.’
And so it was this March in Delhi when he created ripples by
his remarks that “in
the not too distant future, American and Indian Navy vessels steaming together
will become a common and welcome sight throughout Indo-Asia-Pacific waters, as
we work together to maintain freedom of the seas for all nations.” It was a dare
to China but more importantly, it appeared to be the clearest signal yet from
Washington that it wants India to be part of a coalition against China. India’s
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar promptly rejected the proposal saying, "As of now, India has never
taken part in any joint patrol; we only do joint exercises. The question of
joint patrol does not arise.”
This public
exchange encapsulates, the state of Indo-US Defence relations: Well-intentioned
but not on the same page yet. That both New Delhi and Washington recognise the
need to deepen their defence partnership is an acknowledged fact. The point of
dissonance is the way to achieve it. India, despite a right of the centre
government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is not inclined to join the US camp,
much to the dismay of US strategic community. Instead, New Delhi wants to
follow the principle of multi-alignment. So, even as it seeks to get US Defence
technology and is willing to collaborate on some key projects like aircraft
carrier, India simultaneously wants to keep its complex relationship with China
on an even keel by following the ‘collaboration-with-competition’ approach, a
policy followed by Washington with Beijing for a couple of decades now.
So, when US
Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter, considered to be the most India-friendly US
official in recent years, came to India in early April, he knew that India will
not accede to all demands that US makes on the defence front. He was quite
contended to announce—with Manohar Parrikar—that the US and India had made
substantial progress on one of the three ‘foundational agreements. The
Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), rechristened as Logistics Exchange Memorandum
of Agreement (LEMOA) as an
India-specific pact, is still a work in progress despite the United States
pushing for it. It will eventually be signed, may be even during Mr Modi’s
upcoming US visit but the time taken over finalising its content demonstrates
India’s reluctance to be seen as an American ‘groupie.’
It must be noted however that
LEMOA is the easiest of the three agreements that the US is keen India should
sign. The other two--the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum
of Understanding (CISMOA) and BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement
for geospatial information)—are politically sensitive issues and even the Modi
government, despite its political heft, will be wary of agreeing to their
provisions. The CISMOA for instance, may inadvertently lock the Indian military
into technology regime driven by the US. About the BECA, Indian authorities
have concerns about collection of data by the US private sector that does its
job on behalf of the US military.
The LEMOA on the other hand, has its roots in the Access and
Cross Servicing Agreement (ACAS), which was signed by the US with its NATO
allies and permitted the alliance partners to access supplies, spare parts,
servicing from each other’s land, air bases and ports. In the era of Cold War
it was essential for allied forces to operate seamlessly anywhere in the world
to support possible military confrontation with the Warsaw Pact nations. It
provided the legal framework for operational flexibility while ensuring
constitutional autonomy of member nations. Since platforms and equipment in the
alliance countries had their origin either in the US or Europe, the positioning
of spare parts for servicing of these platforms while transiting through any of
these alliance nations, provided legal protection against local taxation
provisions and adverse public opinion.
As Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha, former
Commander-in-Chief of India’s Western Naval Command wrote last week: “However,
the bilateral relations of US with number of other countries became strategic
in nature with changing geopolitics which necessitated similar agreement for
more reasons than just the transit access. Slightly modified agreements were
signed with Singapore, Afghanistan, Philippilnes and Sri Lanka. None of these
countries have lost their strategic autonomy. They deal with China and rest of
the world with equal ease. Sri Lanka has often provided logistics support to
Chinese submarines and naval vessels at its ports. In fact, they have all
benefited by acquiring US hardware, logistics and spares support...”
The discussion on the basic agreements apart, US
and India are currently busy operationalising the Defence Trade and Technology
Initiative (DTTI). Four pathfinder projects, agreed to during President Barack
Obama’s visit in January 2015, are in various stages of finalisation but are
yet to fructify. Similarly, India and the US conduct several joint exercises
across the three services. The Indian Air Force (IAF), very recently
participated in the ‘Red Flag’ Exercise in Alaska; the Indian and US Armies
regularly have Exercise Yudh Abhyas while Exercise Malabar, initially a
bilateral arrangement between Indian and US navies has now expanded to become a
tri-lateral exercise with Japan. In fact, last week, four ships of the Indian
Navy have sailed to Malacca Straits, an area of maritime interest to the India.
They will be deployed on 75-day long operational sojourn in the South China and
North West Pacific. During this overseas deployment, the ships of Eastern Fleet
will make port calls at Cam Rahn Bay (Vietnam), Subic Bay (Philippines), Sasebo
(Japan), Busan (South Korea), Vladivostok (Russia) and Port Klang (Malaysia).
In addition to showing the Flag in this region of vital strategic importance to
India, these ships will also participate in MALABAR-16, a maritime exercise
with the US Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Forces. This is in keeping
with the new spirit of cooperation between Pentagon and the Indian MoD.
Remember, a joint
statement by Carter and Parrikar during Carter’s latest visit to India in April
announced a new Maritime Security Dialogue and discussions on anti-submarine
warfare and submarine safety. These flow from the path-breaking 2015 Joint
Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region issued by Obama
and Modi.
So where are Indo-US relations headed?
The potential for collaboration in Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations between Indian and US forces
is immense but there is unlikely to be any joint patrol or joint operations by
the two militaries given India’s abhorrence to be seen as a US camp follower.
India will always try and nurture its defence relationship with Russia and
other European countries such as France by keeping a slight distance with the
US which, India’s policy makers feel, has been an unreliable partner in the past.
The continued patronage extended by Washington to Pakistan is a reality India
cannot ignore despite the recent reports about Washington asking Islamabad to
pay for the F-16s it wants from the US.
It is fair to assume therefore that India-US
defence ties will be marked by some areas of convergence and some divergence in
approach. Fortunately, leadership on both sides is pragmatic enough to
understand that their worldviews do not always match and therefore neither
expects the other to support blindly. Within that constraint, Pentagon and
South Block are doing fine in taking defence relations between US and India to
the next level.
