The India-China Face-Off: Testing Times for the Indian Leadership
5 May 2013
Nitin Gokhale
Nitin Gokhale
For Nisar Ahmed, the sudden arrival of television crews into Leh,
Ladakh’s capital, last week was disconcerting. As a top hotelier, he
was sprucing up his two properties to get ready for domestic tourists
who start flocking in droves to this high altitude desert. But last
week he also had a small worry. A border incident in which Chinese
troops had entered 19 km deep in the Indian Territory and stayed put,
created quite an international stir. For Ahmed, however, this was not
new. What worried him, thought, was the hype.
“The tension that we see these days on the border is not new. In the
past too, such incidents have happened but it has no affect on the
local business. As far as the business in Leh and the tourism is
concerned, it is quite smooth. However we would like that nothing more
happens because the backbone of the economy of the Leh Ladhaki people
is tourism, and [any] escalation of tensions might cause some decline
in tourism which will affect the economy of the local people. I urge
the media not to blow this out of proportion,” Ahmed said.
Ahmed and his fellow hoteliers are looking at the issue from a
personal perspective but in the rest of India, China’s blatant act of
aggression has caused outrage and anger. Predictably, political leaders
in India have accused the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
of being soft and indecisive. Mulayam Singh Yadav, a former defence
minister and an ally of the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
roared: "This government is cowardly, incompetent and good for
nothing," he said, while objecting to the upcoming visit of External
Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid to China. Khurshid, who is expected to
visit Beijing on May 9, is scheduled to meet his counterpart to
finalise the agenda for new the Chinese Premier’s India visit in late
May.
Describing China as the "biggest enemy",
Mulayam Singh said in Lok Sabha (lower House of Parliament): "We have
been warning that China has started occupying our territory. But [the]
government is not listening to all this."
Singh perhaps reflected the majority view in the country. China is
seen as an aggressor by ordinary citizens; the perception mainly born
out of the brief but brutal war the two countries fought way back in
1962 and the one India lost. Half a century later, the 4,000 km long
boundary between the two across the Himalayas remains undemarcated,
leading to frequent misunderstandings and intrusions by troops into
each other’s perceived area.
Both sides have put in place several mechanisms to ensure that small
incidents on the border do not get out of hand. In a break from the
pattern, however, the Chinese troops have pitched tents and stayed on
for more than two weeks, and thus posing a dilemma for Indian decision
makers.
The latest flare up may, in fact, test the patience and resolve on
both sides. On April 23, Syed Akbaruddin, spokesman for India's
External Affairs Ministry, asked China to agree to a status quo even as
he sought "time and space" for satisfactory resolution of the latest
impasse on the border. His counterpart in Beijing, Hua Chunying,
resorted to the usual rhetoric: "The two sides should work together to
properly solve this issue left over from history through peaceful
negotiations, so as to create good conditions for sound development of
bilateral relations,’’ she said.
However, when the Chinese military put forward two pre-conditions at
the flag meeting on April 23, it was clear that the PLA had intruded
and camped in the Depsang area of the Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) sector
with a definite plan. The Chinese military wanted India to stop
building outposts and logistics depots in the vicinity and stop
patrolling areas close to the perceived border before its troops went
back; terms that India is unlikely to agree to. India, on the other
hand, wants China to restore status quo as it existed in the area
before April 15.
Srikanth Kondapalli, a foremost China watcher in India, and
professor in Chinese Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, says:
“The transgression incident and the bilateral responses indicated to
the inability of the current mechanisms to deal effectively with any
flare-ups on the borders. Indian responses to such incidents are
pitched at three levels: political leaderships’ intervention; invoking
diplomatic-bureaucratic procedures; and tactical conventional military
preparations.”
Eventually, both sides may decide on a face saving compromise by
agreeing to some of the points, but Beijing will use the latest episode
to push for yet another bilateral mechanism for border management.
Officers on the ground in Ladakh, say the present stand-off does not
reflect any new policy but is part of the standard Chinese patrolling
philosophy along the borders including the DBO. The Chinese will use
this opportunity to revive a proposal put forward during Chinese
Defence Minister Liang Guanglie's visit last November, that to avoid
such confrontations, the troops at the borders should advise each other
of their patrolling programmes/schedules.
But why did the Chinese choose to come and camp in the DBO area? The
DBO is an important area for India's defences, and was known even
before the 1962 border war between the two nations. Located right in
the middle of what is officially known as Sub Sector North (SSN), the
DBO had a rough and ready airstrip available to Indian forces even
before 1962. Located east of the Siachen glacier, the region is seen as
strategically crucial for the Chinese, since the road that connects the
two restive provinces in China — Tibet and Xingkiang — are very close
to the area. China clearly wants to secure strategic depth to its
civilian and military projects in the vicinity by pushing the Indian
troops far away.
Despite its strategic location, Indian defence planners have tended
to ignore infrastructure development of the area. Until recently, the
DBO could be reached only by air. Troops deployed in the forward areas
had to march for three days from Sasoma in Nubra Valley or along the
Shyok River before reaching the DBO. Sources say, however, that
recently a road along the Shyok River has been constructed to enable
vehicular movement. The DBO airstrip, reactivated in 2008, is now able
to handle AN 32 and hopefully the newly inducted C130 J medium lift
aircraft. So far, the Indian Army deployment in the DBO area has been
negligible. Instead, it is the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) which
has been entrusted with the task of guarding this stretch of the Line
of Actual Control (LAC).
What next?
The army assesses that the stand-off might continue for weeks
without either side blinking and, more importantly, without further
escalation. Sources have ruled out any sort of military response to the
incursion, but the Indian Army has ordered a re-assessment of
vulnerable areas. But the longer the face off persists, the worse it is
for the government since the perception that New Delhi is unable to
deal with Beijing’s bullying tactics will only get reinforced with time.
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