The Agni-V canister launch video

Video Courtesy: DRDO

The Army's Kashmir dilemma

The martyrdom of Colonel M N Rai, who died in Kashmir in terrorist firing, has once again opened the old debate on how the Indian Army should conduct its counter-insurgency, counter-terrorist operations under the changed circumstances in the border state.

Colonel Rai, a highly effective commanding officer, heading the 42 Rashtriya Rifles battalion, was killed in indiscriminate firing by two terrorists holed up inside a house in a village near Tral in South Kashmir even as he held back launching an operation after villagers requested him to wait for them to surrender.

Friends and relatives of the two local youth, who were hardcore members of a terrorist outfit, told Colonel Rai that they would prevail on the two men to surrender after the CO reached the village with his Quick Reaction Team following an intelligence tip off.

Even as he held back, the well-armed terrorists came out firing indiscriminately, killing Colonel Rai and a brave policeman, Head Constable Sanjiv Singh on the spot.

Colonel Rai's approach, part of an Indian Army doctrine based on WHAM -- Winning Hearts And Minds -- was correct under the circumstances that have prevailed in Jammu and Kashmir for at least a couple of years.

After nearly a quarter century of intense Counter Intelligence-Counter Terrorism ops bordering on outright war, the Army has seen the tempo tapering off a bit in the past few years, at least in the hinterland.

The 25-year long conflict is in fact going through a stabilisation phase that requires a combination of force and tact in dealing with terrorists taking shelter in populated areas. The handling becomes all the more difficult if the encounter involves local terrorists.

Colonel Rai's colleagues, his subordinates and some veterans say he did exactly what any CO of the Indian Army has done for years in Kashmir: Deal with terrorists/militants in a humane manner.

So when the villagers requested Colonel Rai to wait until they persuaded the two terrorists to surrender, he readily acceded. Little did Colonel Rai know that his trust would be betrayed.

Increasingly, Rashtriya Rifles battalions deployed in large numbers in Kashmir's interiors are faced with this dilemma. On the one hand, there is a need to reduce the Army's footprint and the earlier overwhelming, in-your face presence, and on the other not weaken the CI-CT grid that allows area domination.

Caught between these two opposite requirements, COs and company commanders, often young men with less than five years service, find it hard to strike a balance.

In coming months and years, this dilemma will only become more acute posing a serious challenge to the Army's endless 'No War, No Peace,' existence in Kashmir.

All COs and their superiors are sure to have taken note of the betrayal that killed Colonel Rai. Corrective measures will be taken quickly. And the Indian Army will continue to do its duty without rancour and remorse.

That is what makes the Indian soldier unique

(http://www.rediff.com/news/column/winning-hearts-or-fighting-terror-armys-kashmir-dilemma/20150130.htm)

Ensure every soldier gets to vote, an Army Officer's wife writes to the Prime Minister

A PIL seeking efficient mechanism to ensure voting rights to the armed forces personnel and their families in their place of posting is likely to come up in the first week of February. Filed by a practicing Supreme Court advocate, who also happens to be the wife of a serving Army officer, the PIL is seen as a landmark application for ensuring voting rights to the soldiers, long denied mostly because of practical difficulties. 

The government has been internally discussing the tricky issue with Army HQ briefing at least four senior ministers on Wednesday about the practical difficulties in implementing what everyone agrees is a fundamental right of every Indian citizen.

Meantime, the Advocate, Neela Gokhale has written to the Prime Minister highlighting the need to give the soldier his due right. Read on: 

To

The Prime Minister of India

South Block

New Delhi

“ Be it the altitude or bitter cold, nothing deters our soldiers. They stand there, serving our nation, They make us really proud”

 Your words Mr. Prime Minister … a testament to the commitment of every citizen of this country, to the national  security and sovereignty and acknowledgement of the sacrifices made by the soldiers for the safety of its citizens. Your decision to spend Diwali with the soldiers on the glacier reveals a discernible patriotic undercurrent. This symbolism encourages me to write to you, sir and bring to your notice some fundamental deprivations faced by the armed forces and their families. 

The Constitution of India enjoins the elections to Parliament and legislative assemblies to be held on the basis of adult franchise. So this means that every citizen of India, who is not less than 18 years of age and not otherwise disqualified on the grounds of non residence, unsoundness of mind, crime, corruption or illegal practice is entitled to be registered as a voter at such election. So then, why is it that there is no efficient mechanism yet, to facilitate the soldier on the far flung glaciers to participate in the electoral democratic process of the country. Or he is just not significant enough in that respect?

Notwithstanding that the Election Commission did commendable work in undertaking processes to reach out to individuals in the most remote localities of the country, yet the process has once again eluded the armed forces personal and their families, posted in far flung areas of the country. The law, as it stands today, only permits the armed forces personnel to register as ‘service voter’ at the place of his ordinary residence, which is deemed to be that place which, but for his posting, would be his ordinary residence. Simply put, his ordinary residence means his native place. It is obvious that many have been away on their call of duty for a long time and thus are not aware of the nuances of their native constituency or the suitability of the candidates seeking to be elected. So they are expected to participate in the process blindfolded, without formation of their own opinion, which reduces the exercise of the right of franchise to an exercise in futility. Even the present postal ballot system has admittedly failed to ensure maximum encouragement to participate in the formation of a vibrant democracy. The factum of ordinary residence of a soldier is created by his posting order, issued by the government itself, purely on operational considerations and none other.  Yet he uncomplaining accepts his orders and performs his duties without demur. Mindful of the fact that permitting enrolment at the place of posting may affect the demographic equations of a constituency, especially in places such as J&K etc, where the army personnel may at times outnumber the general populace, yet the resolution lies somewhere in the middle of the devil and the deep sea.

Being an army officer’s wife myself and concerned with the issue, I have approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing a writ petition and urging the court to address the issue and direct a suitable resolution. True to my faith in its invincible ability to deliver timely justice, as an interim measure, the Hon’ble Court permitted the  armed forces personnel posted in family stations, to enroll at their places of posting during the recent Lok Sabha Elections. That perhaps resulted in a greater than ever participation of the armed forces personnel in the recent elections.  The petition is yet pending determination by a larger bench.

It is a complex issue, but given the underlining theme of participatory governance adopted by your government and the reclamation of the grounds lost by the hereto before policy paralysis, it would be both, expeditious and consistent, that this imbroglio be addressed and resolved by means of your executive intervention than determination by the court. The letter of the law does seem to inculcate the principle of adult franchise vide cursory provisions for the ‘service voter’ in the RPI Act, but the spirit of the principle of franchise has been relegated to the intentions of the framers of the constitutions, which I feel sure, your government will correct at the earliest.

Neela Gokhale

Advocate

Supreme Court of India

China, India and the Sri Lanka Elections

(http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/china-india-and-the-sri-lanka-elections/)

Image Credit: REUTERS/Dinuka Liyanawatte

India has ceded influence in Sri Lanka to China. Could the upcoming election change that?

By Nitin A. Gokhale

In less than a week, President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka will be facing the toughest political battle of his life as the country votes in the presidential elections on January 8. The Sinhala strongman, credited with ending a 30-year war against the separatist Tamil Tigers in 2009 was expected to have a cakewalk until one of his closest colleagues Maithripala Sirisena walked out of the ruling combine and mounted a credible challenge after the fragmented opposition rallied around him.

The outcome of the polls will be watched keenly in at least two foreign capitals – New Delhi and Beijing – since both have large stakes in the island nation. While India’s strategic interests in Sri Lanka are vital, it also has cultural and religious ties with the Sri Lankan society going back centuries. China, a relatively new presence on the island, on the other hand, has made large strategic and commercial investments in Sri Lanka over the last decade, thanks to a decidedly pro-China policy adopted by Rajapaksa.

As the contest between Sirisena and Rajpaksa tightens with each day, there must be some worried folks back in Beijing. The Chinese presence in vital sectors of Sri Lanka is huge, and the opposition, led by Sirisena and backed by former President Chandrika Kumaratunga and former Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe, is not exactly well-disposed towards Beijing.

Consider this: Between 2005 and 2012, China provided $4.8 billion as assistance to Sri Lanka. Of this only 2 percent has been in the form of outright grants; the remaining 98 percent took the form of soft loans. By contrast, a third of India’s 1.6 billion dollars in assistance to the island comprises outright grants.

There’s more. In the last two years (2012-14), China has committed in excess of 2.18 billion dollars, again mostly in the form of long-term loans. Most of these funds are destined for priority sectors like roads, expressways, ports, airports, power, irrigation, water supply and railways.

Rajapaksa’s supporters contend that all these projects are commercial ventures and Sri Lanka had no option but to depend on Chinese loans, given that the West has largely kept away, citing alleged human rights violations during the final phases of Eelam War IV. The argument is only partially true. The Chinese have cleverly played on Colombo’s fears of isolation and granted concessional loans. Critics of the Rajapaksa regime fear that the Sri Lankan government will be unable to repay such large loans in time, giving the Chinese an opportunity to turn part of the loan into equity, making them part owners of vital projects and installations.

The most glaring example cited by opponents of the Rajapaksas is the Hambantota Port Development Project. For the first phase, the Chinese provided almost 85 per cent of the total cost of $307 million. The second stage (signed in September 2012) will cost $810 million.

The interesting part is that the supply-operate-transfer agreement signed during Chinese President Xi Jingping’s September 2014 visit includes a 35-year lease of four out of seven container berths to a Chinese company. It is pertinent to note that the Hambantota project is just a few nautical miles from one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, with more than 4,000 oil tankers passing by each year.

Although the Indian establishment will long regret not taking up Rajapaksa’s offer to develop Hambantota, New Delhi is surely worried about the Colombo Port City Project, a massive $1.4 billion plan to reclaim 233 hectares of land from the sea along a prominent promenade in Colombo. Of the 233 hectares, the Chinese are being given 88 hectares on a 99-year lease. Interestingly, another 20 hectares will be given to China on a freehold basis. In other words, China or the Chinese company will be a part owner of the project.

In the Sri Lankan capital, the South Container Terminal at Colombo Port is operated by a China-led consortium, which has a 35-year right of ownership under a build-operate-transfer agreement. The Chinese submarine that berthed in Colombo chose to use this terminal and not the main port and so did a Chinese naval ship earlier. The Sri Lankan government has tried to assure New Delhi on this count, by pointing out that all dealings with the Chinese are on a commercial basis and have no geo-strategic importance, a claim believed by no one in India. Why should India worry about increasing Chinese presence in the Colombo port? New Delhi has legitimate concerns since at least 70 percent of transhipment business at the Colombo port is India-related.

However, for India the greater worry should be Colombo’s enthusiastic endorsement of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and linking the development of Colombo and Hambantota Ports to the Chinese-led initiative. When Xi came to Colombo in September 2014, Beijing and Colombo announced the establishment of a Joint Committee on Coastal and Marine Cooperation to explore joint ventures in ocean observation, marine and coastal zone management, maritime security, search and rescue, and navigation security. This, Indian experts contend, would allow China a free run to carry out surreptitious maritime surveys and snoop on southern India.

The government of Narendra Modi is surely cognizant of these developments but it will take multi-directional efforts to regain the strategic space India has lost in Sri Lanka over the past decade. The previous UPA government, hampered by domestic political compulsions and its own confusion over India’s role in Sri Lanka, ceded ground to China once it refused to supply military hardware to Colombo in its war against the Tamil Tigers. In contrast, post-2005 China increased its military supplies to the Sri Lankan military manifold. By a conservative estimate, more than 60 percent of the equipment in the arsenals of the Sri Lankan Air Force and Army are of Chinese origin. In the near future, the Chinese are likely to take the defense relationship to the next level by supplying Sri Lanka with fighter aircraft and warships. Although annually more than 800 Sri Lankan officers across the three services still train in Indian military establishments, the Sri Lankan military’s dependency on Chinese equipment is surely something that worries India no end.

However, New Delhi would perhaps prefer to wait for the result of next week’s presidential election to recalibrate its own policies towards Sri Lanka, no matter who the eventual winner is.

Nitin A. Gokhale is the author of Beyond NJ 9842: The Siachen Saga.


A Race too close too call

(http://www.asianage.com/columnists/race-too-close-call-900)

For Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa, this is a moment of reckoning. His bid to get re-elected for an unprecedented third term, is facing a serious challenge mounted by the Opposition re-energised after Mr Rajapaksa’s long-time party and ministerial colleague, Maithripala Sirisena defected from the ruling combine.

Mr Sirisena, backed by former President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the United National Party’s (UNP) Ranil Wickramasinghe has turned the presidential election into a credible contest, a prospect that looked improbable even a month ago. A series of defections by smaller allies representing the Muslims has further eroded Mr Rajapaksa’s support.

Two major factors must worry Mr Rajapaksa. One is the division in his core Sinhala vote and the other is the prospect of minorities Tamils and Muslims voting heavily against him. This is a big change from 2010, when he won the elections comfortably thanks to a famous military victory over the Tamil Tigers that ended a 30-year war in the island nation.

Since then Mr Rajapaksa’s popularity has eroded considerably because of charges of authoritarianism, financial corruption and nepotism. A two-third majority in Parliament allowed the President to rewrite the Constitution and lift the restriction on holding the office of the President for more than two terms.

That at least five of Mr Rajapaksa’s immediate family members are in key government positions gives ammunition to his critics. In the last five years, the party took a backseat, leading to widespread corruption, lawlessness and cronyism, the Opposition has charged. Mr Sirisena, for long an insider, now says the concentration of power in the hands of the Rajapaksa family and large-scale corruption forced him to leave the government.

The real battle is to gain maximum support from the majority Sinhala vote in the 15-million strong electorate. In the 2010 elections, Mr Rajapaksa had polled more than double the votes secured by his main opponent, former Army Chief Sarath Fonseka in the Sinhala majority areas of south, central and western provinces but this time, Mr Sirisena has the advantage of ultra-radical, right-wing Sinhala party like Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and a prominent Buddhist monk Sobitha Thero, backing him against the President.

But it’s not a done deal yet.

Mr Rajapaksa, with his easy, if cultivated charm and an image of a decisive leader is adept at playing on Sinhala nationalist sentiment. He has already promised a new Constitution committing himself once again to the unitary status and has committed himself to establish a domestic investigative mechanism for probe into the alleged war crimes even while preventing any international scrutiny into alleged human rights violations. This appeals to the hardcore Sinhala voter base. In Colombo, revulsion against the Rajapaksas and yearning for change is palpable but the rural vote outside the capital still seems largely behind the President. Many Sinhalas, especially women, still root for Mr Rajapaksa’s “macho” image and his firm handling of terrorism.

Mr Sirisena also needs to make a dent in the Tamil heartland to get ahead of Mr Rajapaksa. With less than 10 days to go for the elections, Mr Sirisena has not spoken a word about the Tamil issue. His manifesto does not even mention the Tamils and their concerns although the influential Tamil National Alliance (TNA) that has widespread support in the North has decided on Tuesday to support him.

Mr Rajapaksa on the other hand, has launched an energetic campaign countrywide and is even touring the Tamil areas frequently. He has not only visited North and East more than once, but has made some promises, which will attract those who had suffered during the war.

Mr Sirisena in comparison appears wimpish and suffers from the perception that the Kumaratunga-Wickramasinghe duo and not him are the real power centres in the Opposition ranks. There is also lack of focus and cohesion among the disparate elements supporting

Mr Sirisena’s campaign. The JHU and the TNA for instance, hold diametrically opposite views on the contentious 13th Amendment that allows genuine devolution of power to the Tamils.

In the larger context these issues may not matter though since anti-incumbency against Mr Rajapaksa is giving the Opposition more than an even chance this time.

The close contest throws up another possibility. For the first time, Sri Lanka may be forced to count the preferential votes. According to the Constitution, a candidate, in order to win, needs to receive “more than one-half of the valid votes cast”, which is 50 per cent plus one vote. One possible scenario is that no candidate receives the required 50 per cent of the votes cast.

What happens then? The voters are allowed to indicate their second and third preferences when they vote in a presidential election. If no candidate receives more than one half of the votes cast, there will be a runoff and preferential votes will come into play. The process is complicated. Initially, all candidates except the two who received the most number of votes will be eliminated from the competition. Then, the second preferential votes of the eliminated candidates, if cast in favour of one of the remaining two candidates, will be added to their account. And finally, the third preferential votes of the eliminated candidates, if cast in favour of one of the two remaining candidates, will be added to their account. Only then the one who receives the “majority of the votes” will be declared the winner.

Political analysts in Sri Lanka say the country has never counted the preferential votes as there has always been a clear winner, even in some of the closest contests. In 1999 for instance, Ms Kumaratunga received 51.12 per cent votes while Mr Rajapaksa in 2005 scarped through with 50.29 per cent of the votes. Will it be any different this time? Will Sri Lanka be counting the preferential votes for the first time? President Rajapaksa would be hoping that the situation would not come to such a pass.

The outcome of the elections will be keenly watched around the world, especially in New Delhi. India’s relations with the Rajapaksas have been bitter-sweet and his tendency to play the China card against India has not really endeared him to New Delhi but Mr Rajapaksa’s alternative is an unknown entity so far. Whatever the outcome of the election slated for January 8, India will need to start afresh in recalibrating its relationship with Colombo.

The author is a strategic affairs commentator and long time Sri Lanka watcher

Did Coast Guard have any choice but to follow SOPs?

Did the Indian Coast Guard goof up in treating a mere fishing boat that had strayed from Pakistan off the Gujarat Coast on New Year’s Eve as a rogue boat carrying terrorists or at least explosives and guns? Was the Indian Coast Guard guilty of using excessive force against some poor smugglers who were trying to earn a living by running contraband as some accounts have suggested?

Or did the Coast Guard take appropriate action which forced what it calls a ‘suspicious boat’ to self-destruct mid-sea to prevent incriminating evidence stashed on board?

The sequence of events I have managed to put together after speaking to people in the know in various agencies, suggests that the Coast Guard did what it is supposed to do: Take appropriate action against rogue elements after following all SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures). Knowledgeable commentators with better access and even better understanding may differ with this account, but as a foot soldier of the national security beat, I have no other choice but to believe what my sources have told me. So here goes.

December 31: 0735hrs: The NTRO (National Technical Resource Organisation) sends out a specific input marked to all those it is required to keep in the loop, giving exact lat-long (latitude-longitude) of a boat that had sailed from Keti Bunder near Karachi and was headed towards the Gujarat Coast. The input had a rough description of the boat too. The intelligence input was based on a communication interception that the NTRO had managed.

0855 hrs: COM-CG, Gujarat, the Coast Guard’s Gandhinagar-based regional HQ received the details at 8.55 from Coast Guard HQ in Delhi.     

  

0935hrs: A Dornier aircraft of the Coast Guard located at Porbander takes off for the first sortie. After about 90 minutes, it cites the boat, bobbing around in mid-sea roughly at the spot that the NTRO had indicated. The Dornier crew relays the information back to Porbander and Gandhinagar. After a 3.40 minute sortie, the Dornier returns to Porbander.

1235 hrs: Another Dornier aircraft is airborne even before the first one lands back. It keeps a hawk’s eye on the boat and sends back detailed description.

1330-1400hrs: NTRO listens in to another three-way conversation between the boat and presumably their handlers based in Karachi (probably personnel of the Pakistani Martime Security Agency) and someone based in Thailand. Occupants of the boat are heard telling their superiors ‘we are waiting.’ Coast Guard decides to keep the air surveillance going by sending a replacement for the second aircraft and also divert a ship, ICG Rajrattan which was on a task in a different area.       

1730, 2030 and 2230 hrs: Coast Guard’s Dorniers are launched at these times to keep an eye on the boat which is neither fishing nor moving but is just hanging around.

2200hrs: INS Rajrattan makes an RV (rendezvous) with the boat after travelling more than eight hours.

The crew tries to raise the boat and its occupants but the moment Rajrattan’s presence is noticed, the lights on the boat are switched off. The boat also tries to move away towards the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL). 

23330hrs: The Rajrattan aware of the possibility of explosives and arms stored onboard the boat keeps circling around it which nevertheless continues its dash towards the IMBL. After about an hour of the cat and mouse game, the Coast Guard ship fires several warning shots. Perhaps finding no other alternative, the occupants onboard the boat decided to set in on fire. Several loud explosions occurr and a massive fire brakes out on the boat. At least four men were spotted on the boat before it sank, a ministry of defence statement had said.

0430hrs-0630hrs, 1^st January: The boat gradually sinks even as Rajrattan stays in the vicinity to look for any survivors. 

Given that the attackers in the 26/11 mayhem had come into Mumbai via sea, immediate parallels were sought to be drawn to that episode but on available evidence, it is still not clear if Mumbai was the target or if the occupants on destroyed boat were assigned to carry out any terrorist attack. What is clear however is the boat was no ordinary fishing vessel. 

Neither was the behaviour of the people on board normal. There have been suggestions that the boat was used by diesel and liquor smugglers. As Coast Guard officials point out, smugglers when caught don’t try to run away. Instead, they normally surrender. And they certainly don’t kill themselves. Occupants of the suspicious boat however not only behaved abnormally but chose to embrace death instead of being caught. 

Why? Simply because they had something to hide even if one was to assume that they were not terrorists but were simply couriers out to deliver deadly cargo of explosives and arms.

Could the Coast Guard have done anything different? Could it have asked for reinforcements from the Navy? Is it guilty of not following SOPs? The Ministry of Defence and India’s security establishment will of course review the entire operation and plug whatever gaps exist. 

The fact is: the country's western sea coast is most vulnerable to intrusion of the 26/11 kind despite the fact that India's maritime surveillance and prevention capabilities have improved significantly. The coordination between different agencies is now almost real time as this operation has demonstrated. Despite such a progress there's no guarantee that future terror attacks can be prevented simply because terrorist have the luxury of choosing the time and space for the attack.

For the past three months, several intelligence inputs have indicated that Pakistan’s ISI continues its relentless attempts to send hit squads of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) into India both through the land and maritime boundaries. Increased vigil by the Indian agencies has prevented any major attack so far but there is no room for self-congratulations or complacency as New Year day’s episode on the high seas has shown.

Treat armed militias in north-east as criminals

My take in rediff: (http://www.rediff.com/news/column/nitin-a-gokhale-the-state-has-abdicated-its-responsbility-for-assam/20141229.htm)

The situation in Assam would be a farce, if it wasn't such a tragedy. Over 80 people, among them women and children, have been mercilessly massacred by a breakaway faction of a group that is purportedly in peace talks with the government.

Every year, for the past decade, the state has been witness to a massacre or a riot affecting innocent civilians. Each time, the State has got away lightly.

Statistics available with the terrorism portal satp.org reveal that the killings in Assam have never ceased, although the state government under veteran Congress leader Tarun Gogoi has claimed the return of peace for over a decade.

Yes, on the surface Assam appears calm; Guwahati and other towns have witnessed a boom in goods and services transactions; multi-storied buildings now dot Assam's capital. Shopping malls, multiplexes, fancy new restaurants have sprung up in large numbers in Guwahati.

But scratch the surface a bit, and the ugly truth is bared: Assam is still a violent state.

According to the statistics on satp.org, a total of 2,652 people (civilians, terrorists and security personnel) died in insurgency-related violence between 2004 and 2014. This does not include those killed in riots which are not infrequent in Assam.

So the fact that the number of killings in Assam over the last two years (423) has surpassed Jammu and Kashmir (378) should not come as a surprise to anyone watching the north-eastern state closely.

The sad reality is: The State has abdicated its responsibility in Assam for the past decade. Instead, it has chosen the path of least resistance and established a symbiotic relationship with the very perpetrators of violence, granting the rag-tag outfits the legitimacy they don't deserve.

Numerous accords, suspension of operations (SoOs) and cosy arrangements with non-State militias by the state government, actively encouraged by the complicity of the United Progressive Alliance-led central government, gave a free run to the beasts who call themselves insurgents.

Be it the accord with the Jewel Garlosa group of Dima Halong Daogah (DHD), a Dimasa tribal militia, raised by a cabinet minister in the Tarun Gogoi ministry to secure his base in the North Cachar Hills district, or the cosy arrangement with the ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom), the NDFB (National Democratic Front of Bodoland) or a little-known rag-tag outfit called KLNLF (Karbi Longri NC Hills Liberation Front), the Tarun Gogoi government, with the active connivance of the Union home ministry, continued to molly-coddle the killers between 2008 and 2012.

Several instances come to mind. In October 2004, for instance, after killing 50 innocent non-Bodos, the NDFB asked Gogoi to call off operations against the outfit. The chief minister promptly obliged in order to facilitate 'peace' talks.

Gogoi's government also accepted without protest the NDFB's claim that it had on its rolls over 1,000 cadres when in reality it was decimated in the previous year's Operation All Clear in Bhutan. The tendency to inflate cadre strength is actually a strategy adopted by these groups to extract as much money from the ever-obliging governments as possible.

The same NDFB carried out one of the most heinous acts of terrorism, killing over 90 people in Guwahati in simultaneous bomb blasts (A confession here: I had got it wrong initially, while reporting the incident). Despite the outrageous killings, the government refused to call off the peace process with the NDFB.

The DHD, the KLNLF with barely 200 to 300 cadres extracted concessions way beyond their capabilities and influence. These killers have been showered with luxuries, hard cash running into several million rupees and treated with kid gloves by the law. They live in safe houses provided by the State, looked after as VIP guests, given all the facilities normally reserved for state guests.

The story is repeated with every militia named above.

The latest outrage, carried out by one of the NFDB's three factions, is nothing but a pressure tactic to gain importance.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Rajnath Singh will have to treat these militias for what they are: Criminals armed with deadly weapons. Otherwise, nothing will distinguish the National Democratic Alliance government from the 10 year-long perfidy of the UPA in Assam.

National interest, not domestic politics should govern India's Sri Lanka policy from now on

The article below was originally written in early October for the CLAWS (Centre for Land Ware Studies) Journal, Winter 2014 edition, much before the elections in Sri Lanka was announced by President Mahinda Rajapaksa. 

The conviction in September 2014 of Tamil Nadu Chief Minister J. Jayalalitha in an 18-year old corruption case will have far-reaching impact on politics in the Dravidian state. But the consequences of the verdict are likely to have far-reaching consequences even for India’s policy towards its southern neighbour Sri Lanka. 

Jayalalitha, whose party the AIADMK rules Tamil Nadu with a handsome majority in the legislative assembly and has the third largest members in the lower house of India’s Parliament, has been a strident critic of New Delhi’s approach towards Colombo, especially its stand on the thorny issue of Indian fishermen getting caught by the Sri Lankan Navy in the Palk Strait that separates the two countries.

Although her party will continue to rule Tamil Nadu (she will take some time to return to the Chief Minister’s chair, if at all), Jayalalitha’s diminished clout is likely to provide some breathing space to the Centre in trying to repair its relationship with Sri Lanka, severely damaged by the events of the past five years, especially after the end of Eelam War IV—the final Sri Lankan military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or LTTE-- which concluded in May 2009.

To understand the ‘on-off’ relationship between New Delhi and Colombo, a closer look at the past decade is therefore essential.

When Sri Lanka launched its military offensive against the LTTE in 2005, New Delhi was caught in a dilemma born out of domestic political compulsions. As a country, India wanted LTTE to be ruthlessly eliminated but the ruling United Progress Alliance (UPA) led by the Congress Party at the centre, was heavily dependent for survival in Parliament on the DMK , a party that was considered a close ally of the LTTE and even seen as a facilitator in Tamil Nadu. For the Manmohan Singh government therefore, it was a tightrope walk in dealing with the Sri Lankan situation. 

It is important to remember that the UPA’s first stint in power (2004-2009) coincided with the beginning of President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s tenure in Sri Lanka. He took over as President in late 2005 and immediately paid a visit to New Delhi. India was aware of Rajapaksa’s intention to take the LTTE head on. Although in the initial days he was advised to seek a negotiated settlement with the Tigers, New Delhi saw merit in Rajapaksa’s argument that the LTTE was only biding its time to regroup and rearm itself 

and that war was inevitable sooner than later. And if the LTTE was preparing for a showdown, Rajapaksa did not want to be caught off guard either. His armed forces needed to be ready for any eventuality.

The President therefore sent his brothers Basil and Gotabaya to New Delhi with a shopping list for essential weapons and equipment that the Sri Lankan armed forces needed. The shopping list included air defence weapons, artillery guns, Nishant UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and laser designators for PGMs (precision-guided munitions).

Initially, New Delhi was non-committal. Top officials involved in the talks on either side told me that in its typical bureaucratic style, New Delhi neither said yes nor said no to the visiting Sri Lankans. So the two brothers went back slightly disappointed but were still hopeful of getting Indian help. Outwardly, India did adopt a hands off policy vis-à-vis the Sri Lanka conflict. But that was because of domestic political compulsions born out of the fact that the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in New Delhi was dependent upon the DMK party from Tamil Nadu for its survival in the Parliament. So, publicly India maintained that it would not give Sri Lanka any offensive weapons.

Yet, in early 2006 India quietly gifted five Mi-17 helicopters to the Sri Lankan Air Force. The only Indian condition was: these helicopters would fly under Sri Lankan Air Force colours. New Delhi clearly did not want to annoy UPA’s Tamil Nadu allies like the DMK unnecessarily. 

The Mi-17s were in addition to a Sukanya Class offshore patrol vessel (OPV) gifted by the Indian Coast Guard to the Sri Lankan Navy Sri Lankan defence sources later told me that these helicopters played a major role in several daring missions launched by the Sri Lankan Air Force to rescue the Army’s Deep Penetration Units and the eight-man teams whenever they were surrounded by LTTE’s counter-infiltration units or when injured soldiers had to be airlifted from deep inside LTTE held territory.

But hampered by domestic compulsion, New Delhi could not go beyond such meagre and clandestine transfer of military hardware. And publicly all that India was willing to acknowledge was the supply of low-flying detection “Indra” radars to the Sri Lankan Air

Force since this equipment was considered a defensive apparatus. Colombo, on the other hand, was becoming increasingly restless since an all-out war with the LTTE looked inevitable. 

The Rajapaksa regime was nothing if not shrewd. It knew the past history. It was aware of the dynamics that determined India’s domestic politics in the context of Tamil Nadu. It was also conscious of India’s anxiety in losing strategic space in Sri Lanka. But above all, the Rajapaksa brothers were pragmatic enough to realize that Sri Lanka needed India’s support in the prosecution of the war against the LTTE, total support from China and Pakistan notwithstanding simply because India was Sri Lanka’s next door big neighbour. Colombo could ignore India but only up to a point.

The final phase of the war was marked by allegations of massive human rights violations and war crimes, with human rights organisations worldwide accusing the Sri Lankan government forces of firing on so-called ‘no-fire zones’ in which thousands of Tamil civilians had sought shelter. During this final phase of the war India played a key role in warding off international pressure on Sri Lanka. After the end of the war, New Delhi went so far as to support the Sri Lankan government in a special session at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on 28 May 2009, voting against a motion that called for an investigation of war crimes. India also helped Colombo in the post-war reconstruction effort by providing financial assistance for infrastructure projects and humanitarian assistance for the displaced population.

Post-2009 however, domestic pressure Tamil Nadu forced the Indian government to join international calls for an investigation of human rights violations and war crimes. In a significant departure from its previous approach, in March 2012 and March 2013, New Delhi voted in favour of U.S.-sponsored UNHRC resolutions that asked the Sri Lankan government to fulfil its commitments and take actions to ensure justice, accountability and reconciliation (2012) and to carry out an independent investigation into alleged human rights law and humanitarian law violations (2013), respectively. 

This was a substantial shift in New Delhi’s approach, which had always been opposed to country-specific resolutions and to interference with the internal affairs of third countries. Colombo did not take this change in India’s stance kindly. 

New Delhi also used all its leverage with Colombo to hold provincial council elections in the Tamil-dominated Northern Province of Sri Lanka in a first and long-delayed step towards the devolution of power and the implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, which provides for the establishment of a system of provincial councils. The elections were ultimately held on 21 September 2013, leading to an overwhelming victory for the Tamil National Alliance. 

The most obvious example of domestic politics casting a shadow over India’s policy towards Sri Lanka came in November 2013 when the 23rd Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) was held in Colombo. The Sri Lankan government had wanted to use this event to regain international legitimacy after the controversy over the UNHRC votes and the repeated doubts on its human rights record. 

The participation of India’s Prime Minister in the CHOGM meeting was therefore considered absolutely essential. But ahead of the CHOGM, both main Tamil parties—AIADMK and DMK—appealed to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to boycott the summit. Several ministers in Singh’s cabinet who hail from Tamil Nadu – among them then Finance Minister P. Chidambaram – were opposed to the prime minister’s participation in the CHOGM. A broad coalition of actors from Tamil Nadu therefore forced the weakened Manmohan Singh to boycott the meeting despite the foreign policy establishment’s argument against it. Officials in the Ministry of External Affairs pointed that New Delhi needed to keep some leverage on the Rajapaksa regime if only to get the Sri Lankan government to work for the welfare of minority Tamils in Sri Lanka.

However, after a huge domestic debate, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh ultimately decided not to participate in the CHOGM further alienating Colombo. But all that was in the past. Since May 26, 2014 when Narendra Modi took charge at the centre as Prime Minister, a subtle shift in India’s policy towards its neighbours is evident. In a move that surprised many, Modi invited all heads of state from the South Asian region for his oath taking ceremony. By doing so, he demonstrated that the central pillar of his foreign policy will be to accord priority to India’s neighbourhood and pay particular attention to ensuring friendly neighbours. In the process, he simultaneously defined the contours of his government’s policy for South Asia and outlined India’s geographic area of immediate strategic interest. 

With an overwhelming and strong mandate behind him, Modi does not need to depend on the Tamil Nadu parties for survival in the Lok Sabha although his government does need AIADMK support in the Rajya Sabha especially in ushering in legislative changes.  

So how will Prime Minister Modi deal with the Sri Lanka policy vis-a-vis Tamil Nadu politics?

His government is likely to follow a two-track approach: expand India’s trade and cultural ties with Sri Lanka on one hand while at the same time continuing to exert pressure on Colombo to fully implement the 13th amendment to its Constitution and working with the Sri Lankan government to ensure that minority Tamils get their rightful due within the framework of Sri Lanka’s existing political and constitutional architecture.

One big challenge to India’s Sri Lanka policy will come from China’s growing influence on Colombo. President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government has played New Delhi against Beijing with great deftness over the past decade and reaped considerable benefits from that policy. New Delhi should be pragmatic enough to realise that it has indeed ceded  space to China in the neighbourhood and especially in Sri Lanka due to its own flip-flops in dealing with Colombo. The Modi government should therefore focus on regaining its foothold in the island nation by following a more pragmatic policy that is not constrained by domestic considerations and is based purely on India’s national interest.