Wednesday, November 26, 2014

INS Vikrant: The Aircraft carrier that hastened the end of 1971 war, no more

A column I wrote for ndtv.com over the weekend

(http://www.ndtv.com/article/opinion/ins-vikrant-s-hull-is-torn-open-624870)
For Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha, one abiding memory of INS Vikrant is from almost a quarter century ago. 

In 1989, Sinha, who recently took premature retirement as Flag Officer Commander in Chief (FOC-in-C) of India's Western Naval Command, was the top gun in the 300 squadron that flew Sea Hawk aircraft from on-board INS Vikrant - India's, indeed Asia's, first aircraft carrier. 


Around that time, INS Virat, India's second aircraft carrier had also entered service, but the Indian navy was short of aircraft.

"We had two aircraft carriers but not enough aircraft so we used to transfer aircraft from INS Vikrant to Virat. Two outstanding officers used to command the two aircraft carriers that time. One of them, Madhvendra Singh, went on to become India's navy chief. The other, Ravi Ganesh, is perhaps the only naval officer to have commanded a nuclear submarine and an aircraft carrier. That was a period of great transition. Soon after we started flying Sea Harriers from Virat," Vice Admiral Sinha remembers.

As India's first aircraft carrier turned into scrap on Friday, Sinha, perhaps the last of the naval aviators who had the distinction of flying both Sea Hawks and Sea Harriers, says Vikrant gave India the confidence to operate an aircraft carrier. 

Vikrant joined the Indian Navy in 1961 but it had an older lineage. It was built in 1943 and joined the Royal British Navy in 1945 as HMS Hercules. A Majestic Class 20,000 tonnes displacement aircraft carrier, the refurbished Hercules, now known as Vikrant, was received at the Bombay harbour by India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1961.

Its finest moment was to come a decade later in the 1971 war with Pakistan. Although most military enthusiasts remember the Indian Navy's daring attack on the Karachi port in 1971, INS Vikrant perhaps played the most crucial part in shortening the war since it cut off reinforcement sent from West Pakistan to what was then East Pakistan, and is now Bangladesh, by policing the Bay of Bengal and bombing towns and cities like Cox's Bazar, Chittagong, Khulna, Chalna, Mongla, Barisal, Do Hazari, Chiringa and Bakarganj.

Using 500 lb bombs, rockets and guns, the aircraft taking off from Vikrant struck airfields, harbours, ammunition dumps, gunboats, armed merchant ships and troop positions. For its stellar performance in the Bay of Bengal, INS Vikrant earned two Maha Vir Chakras and 11 Vir Chakras.

When it was brought to India in 1961, Radhakrishna Hariram Thaliani, then a young lieutenant, became the first Indian naval pilot to land the Sea Hawk onboard the Vikrant. RH Thaliani went on to command INS Vikrant and also become the Indian Navy Chief between 1984 and 1987.

Vikrant in fact outlasted the Admiral's career in the navy. It was not until 1997 that it was finally decommissioned. It served as a maritime museum till 2004 but many proposals, including converting it into a permanent museum for future generations, failed to materialise due to financial constraints.

When Vikrant's hull was torn open on Friday, a piece of India's recent maritime history was destroyed forever. Interestingly, all ships of the majestic class built in British shipyards were to serve in navies other than that of Great Britain. Two ships each served the Canadian and the Australian navies. Those four ships were decommissioned long ago and subsequently and scrapped. The fifth, the Hercules, was bought by the Indian Navy and renamed the Vikrant. The construction of Leviathan, the sixth ship in this class was never completed. The incomplete ship was scrapped way back in 1968. 

But Navy buffs may want to take solace at the fact that Vikrant's name will not fade away from memory. India's first indigenous aircraft carrier, being built at the Cochin shipyard, is also named INS Vikrant. Launched in August 2013, INS Vikrant is expected to be commissioned into the Indian Navy in 2018.

So, four years from now, we may have another Vikrant joining the Indian Navy nearly 60 years after the original Vikrant became part of the then fledgling naval arm of India. That's perhaps a small consolation on a day when Asia's first aircraft carrier was taken down piece by piece.

Sunday, November 16, 2014

Lift AFSPA wherever possible, don't repeal it

Two developments in Kashmir during the past fortnight have brought the focus back on the Indian Army and the much-misunderstood Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958.

First, the killing of two teenagers in Badgam by troops of Rashtriya Rifles and the subsequent admission by the Northern Army Commander, Lt Gen DS Hooda that ‘our boys made a mistake,’ has given a handle to the critics of the AFSPA fuelling once again the oft-repeated demand to repeal the law.

However, the verdict in the high-profile Machil fake encounter case of 2010 that sentenced 5 Army men to life under the Army Act, 1950 (the punishment will have to be confirmed by the Northern Army Commander) within days of the Badgam incident has silenced—even if momentarily—critics of Army’s justice system.

But going beyond the immediate, a closer look is needed at the AFSPA and the circumstances under which it has come to acquire such negative connotations. Discussion on the law however gets clouded by emotions, distrust and even lack of understanding about the circumstances under which it is applied.

Remember, the AFSPA, when promulgated in 1958 to empower the Army in combating the nascent Naga insurgency, was meant to be an emergency law. Unfortunately, in the all-round mishandling of the aspirations in the north-east and the multitudinous rebellions it spawned in the region, the AFSPA, and not the all-round failure of the Indian state, been demonised. Instead of being used in short spurts, the AFSPA has been allowed to be applied continuously for 56 years. Who is responsible for this state of affairs? Not the Army, surely. After all, it is deployed after the police and other agencies fail.

So who is to be blamed? It must squarely lie with the political executive.

Take the case of Assam. For the past decade at least, the Tarun Gogoi government could have let the police and the central police forces handle the remnants of insurgency still active in some parts of the state. But he has repeatedly resisted any move to drastically reduce or even end the Army’s counter-insurgency role. And if the Army has to operate in an internal security scenario, it needs the protective umbrella of the AFSPA just as the police operate under the IPC and CrPC.  

The mere fact that the provisions of AFSPA have to be invoked in a particular area ex facie establishes that handling the law and order situation had gone beyond the control of the state government.  The Army personnel, operating in those circumstances need to enjoy at least similar powers as the Police force if not wider ones.  So, just as Section 45 of the CrPC disallows arrest of public servants (read police and CPAF personnel in this context) and just as Section 197 provides impunity against prosecution, Section 7 of the AFSPA gives similar protection to the Army personnel. Nothing more, nothing less. And yet, most opponents of the AFSPA have chosen to either downplay or completely ignore this similarity. In the case of J&K, the Army needs legal protection all the more since applicability of CrPC is disallowed in the state that operates under a different set of law called the Ranbir Penal Code.
The circumstances too were different than those in the North-east.

When the AFSPA was made applicable in the state of J&K in 1990, India was fighting a proxy war fuelled by an implacable adversary. In the past 25 years, the country’s collective efforts have brought down all known parameters of violence down to manageable levels with the help of the Indian army.  For a quarter century, the Army was the only functioning government agency in most parts of Kashmir. But it’s certainly time for the Army to ‘step back’ a little in J&K and allow the civil administration to start playing their part in providing good governance.

That said, while there may be a comparative decline in terrorist violence, there is no change in the Pakistani ideology and will to support proxy war in J&K. The infrastructure to support such a proxy is all intact and being regularly upgraded.  Between 35 and 42 training camps are active in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. Moreover, counter terrorist operations by the army are not restricted to the Line of Control but cover the entire state.  Administrative support including convoys carrying Army personnel and stores moving to the LoC pass through urban areas in the hinterland and are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Hence AFSPA cannot be applied in pockets of J&K along the LoC while withdrawing the Act from the remaining areas, as is being advocated by Chief Minister Omar Abdullah or even former Home Minister P. Chidambaram.

The army has sound reasons to resist withdrawal of AFSPA. For instance, it says lifting of AFSPA from urban areas / large towns in J&K will result in terrorists seeking shelter in such areas and rebuilding their bases, as has been witnessed in Manipur’s capital Imphal, post-2004.

Moreover, all lines of communication in J&K pass through population centre and have to be kept open at all cost. The Army garrison / strategic assets are spread over in population centres and de-notification will render them vulnerable to terrorist action and hence require separate security arrangements. Any action taken by the Army personnel in these areas will be governed by Ranbir Penal Code which does not confer immunity from arrest will further complicate the issue.

The revocation of AFSPA from any area needs a concerted view of all organs of the State and Centre. A suggested way is to convert these areas into Police administered areas/ Police districts as was done for Srinagar initially without revoking AFSPA. Subsequently as the situation improves, while evolving the revocation, an exit strategy needs to be worked for gradual withdrawal of armed forces from the specified area leading to smooth transition.

Lifting the AFSPA can certainly be attempted but the provisions of the AFSPA, as an emergency law that empowers the Army—the nation’s instrument of last resort-- must however continue to remain on the statute books given the increasingly violent and uncertain times that the sub-continent is likely to face in coming years. When needed, it must be applied in small doses. Every country has to balance the need for a stringent law with the basic principles of ensuring human dignity and human rights. Therein lies the challenge for India’s leadership. 

Thursday, November 6, 2014

Modi govt sure-footed in dealing with Beijing but needs to adopt two-pronged approach

Earlier this week, at a closed door meeting of Indian strategic thinkers and half a dozen Chinese scholars on South Asia, the fault lines in the often troubled Sino-India relationship unexpectedly surfaced once again highlighting the enormous differences that persist in dealing with the contentious boundary question.


One of the visiting Chinese scholars, perhaps provoked by an aggressive Indian query on China’s continuing policy of using Pakistan as cat’s paw against India, squarely laid the blame for recent troubles at the un-demarcated border at India’s door. “It is the new forward policy practiced by India, especially in the grey areas which exist in the Western sector that has led to the recent incidents on the border,” was the burden of the Chinese scholar’s argument.
The underlying message was: Just like in the run up to the 1962 war, India is the aggressor once again and all its actions in border areas were “leading to negative consequences.”
Of course the more senior lot in that group spoke in the usual platitudinous tone about the need to ‘resolve the border dispute through mutual respect and mutual compromise,’ one of them even outlining three pre-requisites for an eventual settlement: Strong political will on both sides; a strong political leader in Beijing and New Delhi and a formula acceptable to the people of both countries!
One of them advised Indians to go through the archives and historical documents to understand the problems that beset Sino-Indian boundary issue and reminded everyone that the border is not demarcated even as the Chinese team skirted the main question as to why each VVIP visit is preceded by an incursion! Of course one Chinese assertion is: there is no incursion, we are always within our own territory!
The reason I have dwelt on a Track II meeting at such length is to underline the almost irreconcilable positions that exist in India and China on the boundary question. We in India believe China is following the ‘creeping’ invasion policy along the border while scholars at prominent Chinese think tanks term India as the aggressor!
If at an informal level there are such obdurate views, the hard line that officials adopt during negotiations can only be imagined.
So what is the current Sino-India equation?
Over the past two years, the relationship graph has seen some highs and many lows.
First the highs: Three bilateral meetings at the highest level possible have taken place since 2013.
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made his first overseas visit to India in May 2013 and mainly spoke about strengthening the India-China economic relationship. In October 2013, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh went to Beijing and signed yet another pact (the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement or BDCA) to try and keep the contested boundary calm. In less than four months after a new government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi took charge in Delhi, Chinese President Xi Jingping was in India. Apart from political contacts at the highest level, even military to military engagements (http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/india-china-border-engagement/) have increased in the past two years and yet, two of the most serious border incidents since the Sumdorung Chu incident in 1987 have taken place in this period.
So the lows: In April 2013,  PLA soldiers walked across the Line of Control (LAC) in the remote and desolate Depsang Plains in Ladakh ((http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/blog-at-heart-of-chinese-incursion-an-airstrip-a-new-road-358356) just a fortnight ahead of Premier Li's visit and stayed put for 21 days before an all-out effort resolved the crisis. The experience of the standoff came in handy when the BDCA was being negotiated. But if any one thought  the face offs, jostling, pushing and pulling between troops at the LAC would stop after signing the latest border pact, they are mistaken.
On the day President Xi Jingping arrived in Ahmedabad this September, 1000 Chinese troops walked across the LAC in South Eastern Ladakh's Chumur area leading to another tense and perhaps the biggest face off in the past 25 years. India's overnight swift response (sending in 2000 troops against the 1000 Chinese) and staring down the Chinese was unprecedented in many ways but even as the crisis ended, questions on why the PLA repeatedly ups the ante on eve of VVIP visits remain unanswered. Many theories (the PLA is not under total control of President Xi, says one implausible conjecture) have been advocated but the most rational reason stems from PLA's effort to keep up the tension on the border since India has belatedly started a massive military build up backed by improved infrastructure all along the Himalayan border.
President Xi and Prime Minister Modi seem determined to not let the boundary issue cloud the overall relationship since both India and China realize the old security architecture is slowly crumbling and both Beijing and New Delhi, along with Tokyo, will have major role to play in the rapidly changing strategic equations. The trick for India will perhaps lie in balancing the strategic competition with China with the need to cooperate on many common issues. As India’s then National Security Advisor, Shiv Shankar Menon, remarked in January 2012, “The issue is whether we (India and China) can continue to manage the elements of competition within an agreed strategic framework which permits both of us to pursue our core interests.” Beyond the bilateral, both countries have recognised and pursued common goals. These  include reforms of the Bretton Woods system, new institutions to advance the interests of emerging economies through steps like the recently launched Asian Bank.
India however needs to guard against increasing Chinese footprints in South Asia. Smaller nations in the region have often played India against China (notably Sri Lanka of late) to their advantage. India will have to arrest the drift in neighbourhood policy to reclaim strategic space in South Asia before its too late.
The new government, even as it appears more assertive and sure-footed in dealing with Beijing, needs to adopt a two-pronged approach. Keep the engagement going even while improving military capability and stitching alliances with countries like Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, South Korea and Australia as an effective foil to China's rise. 
















































































































Friday, October 24, 2014

Make the military strong, Mr Prime Minister. Without that, economic progress means nothing

Soldiers deployed on Siachen glacier, had reasons to be happy on Diwali day yesterday.

After all, not every day (or year) does the Prime Minister of the country come visiting laden with sweets and good wishes. Prime Minister Narendra Modi surprised almost everyone by deciding to fly to the Siachen Glacier on Thursday before his scheduled and publicised-in-advance visit to Srinagar.

Siachen by far is the most inhospitable and difficult area to be deployed.

With altitudes ranging from 12- to 23,000 feet and temperatures dipping to 50 degrees below zero, this perpetually snow-bound glacier has been a bone of contention between India and Pakistan ever since Indian troops captured the vital heights in April 1984 under Operation Meghdoot ( For details of that operation read excerpts from my book here: http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=419).

Over 3000 soldiers are posted to guard the Saltoro ridge that divides Indian and Pakistani territories and gives India the edge since the Indian Army occupies all the strategic heights. The facilities on the glacier have improved way beyond the imagination of the pioneers who worked under most trying conditions (Here's a shameless plug: Please buy and read my book Beyond NJ 9842: The Siachen Saga to understand what Indian army and air force has achieved. Available here: http://www.amazon.in/Beyond-NJ-9842-Siachen-Saga/dp/9384052051/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1414147961&sr=8-1&keywords=Beyond+NJ+9842).

Yet, Siachen continues to remain the most difficult area to serve in. So it was a great morale booster for soldiers and airmen to have the Prime Minister spend time with them on Diwali day. Going by the Press note from the PMO, it is also clear that Mr Modi spoke of most issues that bother soldiers and reassured them in a way.

"The Prime Minister assured the jawans that wherever they are, and serving or retired, the country stands shoulder to shoulder with them. He said their dreams and responsibilities are the entire country`s responsibility. He said he would do his utmost to ensure a life of dignity for them. The Prime Minister said the promise of One Rank, One Pension had been fulfilled, and preparations were being made for a National War Memorial, that we could all be proud of," the press note at the end of the PM's visit said.

A big assurance from the Prime Minister himself on two major issues bothering serving and retired soldiers. One, they are not treated with dignity that soldiers deserve--which is largely a societal problem, rather than administrative. (Read:http://www.rediff.com/news/column/column-the-indian-solider-and-his-struggle-with-change/20131012.htm). He has promised to take steps to lend dignity to soldiering.

The second issue--granting One Rank One Pension (OROP), that is equal pension to all soldiers irrespective of their date and year of retirement--is more tangible and completely within the control of the government. So while one would like to believe the Prime Minister when he says OROP promise has been fulfilled, many veterans have complained that there is no sign of OROP being implemented.  In view of these two totally contradictory views, the government needs to communicate clearly on what the exact status on this issue is.

Welfare of veterans is one major issue but the Prime Minister and his defence-cum-finance minister Arun Jaitley also need to take a call on reforming the country's higher defence management architecture at the earliest. Unless that is done, no amount of good intentions would bring in the much needed spring-cleaning in the obdurate and moribund defence ministry.

Much has been written and spoken about the non-existent synergy between civilian bureaucracy and the military but the latest salvo fired by former Navy Chief Adm DK Joshi, who resigned suddenly in February is worth pondering over. In an interview to me, Adm Joshi was scathing about the reality in the higher defence management structure.

He said: "The root cause is this dysfunctional and inefficient business model that we have, wherein professional competence, domain expertise, accountability, responsibility and authority, these all reside in separate silos in different locations. While professional competence, accountability, responsibility is with the service that is not the case with authority. And by authority I really mean the power to approve something, empowerment to approve something or the other. For example, change of submarine batteries, which are available indigenously or for commencing refits and repairs of ships, aircraft, submarines in Indian yards, the service does not have that empowerment. That's a broad construct as a background. Where there is authority there is no accountability. And where there is responsibility there is no authority.

"You don't have to accept this coming from me. For more than a decade now recognising fully that higher management of defence needs reforms, several expert committees have been formed. Virtually all their recommendations have been identical, but vested interests have ensured that the more substantive ones, which bring authority and accountability together, have not been approved. Some peripheral ones have been progressed but nothing substantive.

"You will be, for example, told listen we have created HQ IDS. But it's a headless wonder, its head was never appointed. I have been CISC, CINCAN tenure. I know it very well. Then they will tell you how the service HQs have been named as Integrated HQs, Ministry of Defence, but as the then Defence Secretary told the Standing Committee on Defence, the changes were mostly cosmetic as indeed they are."


The indictment of the structure that handles India's defence could not have been more severe. Adm Joshi, I must confess, was also unsparing about a section of the media for its motivated campaign against the navy but that's a different story which will have to wait for another time.

For the moment, suffice it to say only a drastic overhaul of the existing system in keeping with the Naresh Chandra Committee recommendations if not earlier reports, can rescue the Indian armed forces from their current state of despair and despondency.

Military bureaucracy in the South Block does speak about a changed atmosphere and approach to decision-making in the Defence Ministry. Service Chiefs, for instance, now meet the Prime Minister once a month, one-on-one in pre-scheduled appointments; the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), which finalizes all purchases, big and small, is slated to meet at least once a month from now on, we are told; civilian bureaucrats who ultimately place orders for weapons purchase and sanction funds for crucial projects are said to call up service headquarters asking for quicker delivery of files in sharp contrast to earlier practice. So things have certainly started happening, but only in small doses.

Like he did with diesel deregulation and labour reforms, the Prime Minister must take the system of defence management by the scruff of its neck and shake it down to get optimum results. There is no other alternative if he wants to see a strong India.

For, no amount of economic progress can make India a force to reckon with if it is not backed by a hard-edged, battle ready military. Therein lies Mr Modi's major challenge.

Sunday, October 12, 2014

It is the de-hyphenation of India-Pakistan that Islamabad fears the most

More than 18 months ago, I was in Dubai as part of a track II effort (my first and perhaps last such participation, given that I am not much of a Pakistan watcher) on how India and Pakistan can overcome their antipathy and strike an enduring, working relationship. The conference covered issues of common interest to the two countries, including trade, business, micro finance, IT, water, energy, climate change, public health, security, and media. I wrote briefly about it in May 2013 (http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/a-new-opportunity-for-indo-pakistan-relations/).

At the conference I spoke on the Indian military doctrine. In the course of my presentation I asserted that the Indian military has, over the past decade, re-oriented itself towards meeting the bigger challenge from China since it exactly knows how to deal with Pakistan. The underlying theme of my assertion was: India has got the measure of Pakistan's predictable military moves and knows how to counter them. The focus therefore is to try and be prepared for the bigger threat, that is China. A retired Pakistani military officer, who was among the delegates, disagreed demonstrably. "How can India forget that Pakistan is a nuclear power?  How can India ignore Pakistan's military power," he remonstrated with me. I could not, till the end, convince him that India was not taking Pakistan's military threat lightly but was merely pointing out that Indian military has moved on to prepare for a far more potent threat. He however, would not believe me.


I recall that little encounter now since the current situation on the border between India and Pakistan, I believe, is also born out of Pakistani establishment's (read the Army's) fear of losing its relevance in the Indian sub-continent. 

For long, the hyphenation of India-Pakistan has been a common international theme. But a small but subtle change in India's approach towards big international players and the immediate neighbourhood, has clearly caught Pakistan on the wrong foot. If Prime Minister Narendra Modi's unexpected move to reach out to SAARC leaders by inviting them for his inauguration was a surprise move, his government's decision to cancel India-Pakistan bilateral talks on the issue of Pakistan's high commissioner to India meeting separatist leaders from Kashmir despite India's warning, was totally unexpected in Islamabad. Suddenly, this was a different New Delhi it was forced to deal with.

The decision makers--Prime Minister Narendra Modi and former spymaster-turned National Security Adviser Ajit Doval--were not going be trapped into a long-held framework of 'talks-with-Pakistan-at-any-cost' that had come to dominate New Delhi's policy on Pakistan, even during the earlier avatar of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government led by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. Instead, they had decided to draw new, firm red lines, even if that meant a breakdown in the dialogue process. So the first red line was 'either talk to us or talk to the separatists.' Both are not acceptable was the clear message.

Simultaneously, Narendra Modi's outreach to other smaller neighbours in the Indian sub-continent--Nepal, Bhutan and a lesser extent to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka--meant India was mending its somewhat wobbly relations with them even as Pakistan was being left out. The last straw however came late in September when Prime Minister Modi traveled to the United States.

First, at the United Nations General Assembly, Modi, much to Pakistan's annoyance, refused to react to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's mention of Kashmir in his speech. Then, more ominously for Pakistan, the joint statement at the end of Modi's meeting with President Barack Obama spoke in unambiguous terms the need to dismantle terrorist havens in Af-Pak.

 "The leaders stressed the need for joint and concerted efforts, including the dismantling of safe havens for terrorist and criminal networks, to disrupt all financial and tactical support for networks such as Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, the D-Company, and the Haqqanis. They reiterated their call for Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai to justice," the statement said. This was unprecedented. 

Was this the beginning of the de-hyphenation of India-Pakistan that Islamabad so dreads? Was Washington finally coming round to accept New Delhi's long-held view that Pakistan-based terrorist groups posed the biggest threat to peace in the Indian sub-continent? For the Pakistani Army, Washington's endorsement of India's stand meant its strategic assets (LeT, the Haqqanis) were in danger of being targeted more vigorously.

This, in the Pakistani Army's mind, was invitation to disaster and more dangerously, to becoming irrelevant. It had to do something to bring Kashmir back in focus and also take control of the country's foreign policy. So what does it do? Fall back on the tried and tested formula of igniting the border with India. 

Predictably, it activates the International Border (or what it calls the working boundary) since tactically and topographically it is easy to target villagers around the BSF posts. In earlier years, India would have also fired back appropriately but at the same time would have asked for an immediate flag meeting with Pakistani border guards. A lull would have followed the meeting but firing would have resumed again, making a mockery of the ceasefire both had agreed to in November 2003. This happened repeatedly in 2012 and 2013.

The current government was however not willing to follow the well-known script. 

Instead, it issued clear instructions to BSF to respond in kind and some more. The BSF was told unambiguously to retaliate heavily whenever provoked. During the weekly DGMO (Director Generals of Military Operations) conference on telephone last Tuesday and through other informal channels, Pakistan was told that talks and violence cannot go hand in hand. So flag meetings at the border were ruled out.In a clear departure from the past, Pakistan was warned that India is willing to climb the 'escalatory ladder', that is take the border firing to another level if it so desired. The idea was to impose, as Defence Minister Arun Jaitley said, "un-affordable cost," on Pakistan.

Military veterans and serving commanders that I spoke with, welcomed this unambiguous statement of intent from the highest quarters. For a decade and more, most tactical moves they made were subject to clearance from Delhi. No longer. "Now we have been given an overall policy framework but tactical decisions are left to us," a serving general in J&K told me. 

Not surprisingly, there have been fears expressed by 'usual suspects' that New Delhi is playing a dangerous game with a nuclear-armed adversary and as a bigger and responsible nation, India should not be indulging in such brinkmanship. So well-entrenched is this view in some quarters on both sides of the border that a Pakistani minister, as if on cue, promptly raised the nuclear bogey.

The fact is: between ceasefire violations and employment of nuclear weapons there are several options available with India to keep Pakistan in check. After nearly 10 days of heavy firing on the border, the tension appears to be winding down. What India must guard against is provocation elsewhere in the form of a covert attack in Kashmir or a terrorist strike in rest of the country. If that happens, the response will have to be punitive. Surely, Indian decision-makers have thought this through and have identified a point where they can terminate the current confrontation after gaining the necessary advantage. Therein lies the trick of using coercive military-diplomatic tactics.

Thursday, October 9, 2014

Do serious work but don't take yourself seriously. The man who told me this is no more

Some time in 1984, in Guwahati, I was still undecided about continuing in journalism after having joined The Sentinel in May 1983. The mind was torn between giving another shot at CDS (Combined Defence Services) exam after having lost a chance to join the Indian Air Force because my graduation results got delayed and continuing with exciting but poorly paid profession of journalism, I ran into a gentle, pleasant man with impeccable manners in Guwahati's only decent Hotel, Belle Vue in early 1984.

MV Kamath was already a legend among journalists, having spent more than three decades in the capitals of the world--Brussels, Washington, London--and having edited the Illustrated Weekly, India's most famous magazine. He had come to visit north-east after a four-five year gap. People in fact remembered him for a cover story in the Illustrated Weekly in the late 1970s describing the region as 'Seven Sisters.'

One evening, then Editor of The Sentinel, DN Bezboruah, a friend of Mr Kamath, sent me on an errand--I was too junior to have interviewed him--to Mr Kamath;s hotel. As I entered his room and introduced myself, his first question was: "What is a Gokhale doing in Assam?" As I narrated my short story, father-in-the-army-posted-in-Guwahati-therefore-I am-here, etc, he ordered a coffee , made me sit down and relax and started chatting about life in Guwahati.As I opened up and told him, how I had walked into The Sentinel one afternoon for a casual interview and had started working that very evening, he remarked:" That's a great accident." His relaxed personality encouraged me to ask him a question that I would normally hesitate to ask a towering personality in the first meeting. 

I blurted out: "Sir, how do you sustain yourself in this uncertain, poorly paid and rarely understood profession?" His eyes twinkled, had a gentle, amused smile on his lips as he contemplated a reply to my seemingly silly question. As he took his time, I thought to myself, have I been impertinent?

But the very next moment, Mr Kamath put me out of my misery. He said: " Son, when I started with the Free Press Journal in the 1950s, my guru and a legend in journalism, Sadanand (I hope I have got the name right because this was so long ago) had put me at ease after I had similar doubts. You know what he told me? He (Sadanand) said as long as you do serious work but don't take yourself too seriously, as long as you realise that you are as good as your last by line and as long as you are discreet, you can be a reasonably successful journalist."

Then Mr Kamath went on elaborate the three mantras: If you are a professional journalist, don't ever think that your work is going to bring in revolution or that you are going to change the world. That job is best left to the revolutionaries (don't take yourself seriously).

As a journalist you have to perform consistently. One flash in the pan, one impact creating story is of no use to those who want to remain engaged with journalism on a long term basis; so never rest on your laurels (You are as good as your last by-line).

Discretion, moderation is the key to successful human interaction. In journalism it is all the more important. People will trust you if you keep your word, keep their confidence. ( It is more important what you don't write than what you write!)

"I have followed these principles to the 'T' and I haven't done badly," Mr Kamath said, smiling mischievously. That was surely an understatement. We chatted some more. I came back and within a month or so I decided to continue with journalism much to my parents' dismay (that story is here: http://nitinagokhale.blogspot.in/2011/11/last-week-friend-in-army-reacting-to-my.html). If I have managed to keep my head above water for the past 31 years, it is simply because I have tried to follow the three principles that Mr Kamath so effortlessly conveyed to me when I was barely 22.

Mr Kamath's influence on my life and profession continued thereafter as I made it a point every time I went to Pune to stop over at Khar in Bombay where he invariably cooked breakfast or made a cup of coffee and chatted about life, journalism and writing, sitting amidst his vast collection of books. He couldn't make it for my marriage but took a instant liking to my wife Neha, when we visited him on our way to Goa in 1988. " Its time to switch priorities Nitin," he told me as a friendly advice; "now journalism has to come second." 

Our contact became infrequent after he shifted to Manipal but I would call occasionally and he would invariably enquire about our growing family, my growth in journalism and continue to be a calming influence.

His life and work is too well know for me to recount the stellar contribution he made to journalism but one habit of his has had a lasting impact on me. Mr Kamath used to write at least a 1000 words every day on his old, battered but beloved Olivetti typewriter, no matter how busy he was. He continued to do so until his last days. The love for writing and the discipline to do it every single day kept him busy even in his 80s and early 90s. 

If I can bring even an iota of his discipline and stamina in my life, I would be more than happy.

Unfortunately they don't make the likes of MV Kamath anymore.

Thank you for all the love and wisdom Sir! 

We will miss you but wherever you have gone, you are bound to make people happy.


Saturday, September 27, 2014

Myanmar: The rich poor land on cusp of big changes



The Shwedagon Pagoda in Yangon

Me and my wife Neha took a 10-day holiday in Myanmar early this month. Here are our first impressions

Burma, now officially known as Myanmar, has an old worldly charm that India’s north eastern states once had: green topography, laidback atmosphere, poor but proud and ever smiling, courteous people. 

But first impressions can also be misleading.

Beneath the surface, however there are stirrings of change that are far reaching. The transition from military rule to democracy is of course the obvious sign of change in Myanmar but more importantly, the economy is gradually moving from a centralised, socialist system towards a more competitive, and open system. 

Airports are busy with domestic flights
For close to five decades, Myanmar fitted the description ‘rich poor land.’ Endowed with tremendous natural and mineral wealth, its 60 million people have however largely languished in extreme poverty. A change in direction by its rulers, especially under President U Thein Sein, has brought Myanmar on the cusp of a paradigm shift much in the same way as India found itself in 1991.

Since 201Myanmar has abolished its old currency exchange regime, restructured its international debt, worked very hard to end decades old economic sanctions and changed its investment laws and policies.

But traveling across some parts of the country, it is more than apparent that Myanmar’s rulers have decided to put the welfare and uplift of its common citizens at the centre of the change. Infrastructure development in the form of roads, telecom, electricity supply and transport services is improving rapidly. Even the civil aviation sector is growing rapidly with as many as a dozen private low cost airliners now connecting the distant small towns in remote provinces giving a boost to tourism like never before.
Bagan: the ancient capital
The common people are upbeat. Whoever I met—hotel managers, restaurant owners, taxi drivers, Indian origin businessmen, government officials, tourist guides—think their country is poised for an unprecedented change and growth. Economic development is on everyone’s mind. The living standards, they all say in unison, are improving; purchasing power is bound to go up. But many also had a word of caution: rapid changes should not destroy the country’s long tradition.

CHINA FACTOR
I had been to the country’s north almost 10 years ago via Moreh-Tamu and that too up to Kelemeyo. So this was virtually a first long trip. And the affinity toward India was for there to see everywhere. The most frequent starting point for conversation with us, once people ascertained we were Indians, was: “Do you know Gaya? Have you been to Gaya? Buddha was an Indian, no?”

Buddhism is ingrained in every walk of life. And the instant connect to India comes from Buddhism. And Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose. Was surprised to learn people still remember the Azad Hind Fauj and its exploits.

And yet, we don’t have any direct flights between Myanmar and Gaya  by any Indian airliner or even a memorial for the INA in Myanmar. 

China and Chinese on the other hand are often described as exploiters, people only interested in business and making money. The sense one gets from commoners and government middle level functionaries is China no longer calls the shots in Myanmar. Enough reports are available in public domain how the Myanmar government is distancing itself from many Chinese projects and even dropping Chinese companies from key infrastructure projects, but the important aspect to me was to see and hear even common people openly despising the Chinese and criticising Chinese goods and their quality.

Most common people I could converse with, wanted Indian goods—trucks, vehicles, clothes, hardware, and even Indian soap operas—to come to Myanmar. Most complained about India and Indians not doing enough to reconnect with their country. It is reflected in the way we Indians neglect Myanmar as a tourist destination. The official figures tell their own story.
The famous Inlya Lake fisherman
In the period between January and June this year, over 95,000 Thais visited Myanmar, followed by 60,000 Chinese and 31,000 North Americans. Only 15,429 Indians deigned to tour the next door and beautiful neighbour in this period. Tourists from distant countries such as Japan (38,000), UK (20,000), France (21,000) and even Korea and Taiwan outnumbered Indians. It says something about our priorities and world view perhaps.
India’s indifference is reflected in air connectivity or lack of it too. There is only ONE weekly direct flight to Yangon from Kolkata. Otherwise one has to fly via Bangkok or Singapore.    

WHAT INDIA NEEDS TO DO
Two years ago then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh went to Myanmar and described India and Myanmar as "natural partners."

He suggested tapping the huge unrealised potential of the economic relationship between the two countries for mutual benefit. During that two-day trip, India and Myanmar signed a number of agreements and put in place a road map for the rapid development relations in the years ahead. 

As diplomatic visits go, it was a great success. But it takes more than usual platitudes to translate a triumphant state visit into a long lasting relationship, coming as this one does after a relatively low profile engagement over the past decade.

In fact the Indian Prime Minister's visit to Myanmar came after leaders from Bangladesh, US, South Korea and Britain had already made their forays into Myanmar. New Delhi, ever so cautious -- or laggard, depending on the prism through which one sees its approach -- has only now tentatively taken the first steps to cash in on Myanmar's opening up. As the Prime Minister pointed out: "Myanmar, with its unique" geographic location, can be a bridge linking South and South East Asia to East Asia and there is much untapped potential in our economic relationship."
The Mahamuni pagoda in Mandalay

After all, India has a major partnership with her neighbouring ASEAN countries in trade and investment. 

Myanmar, now a member of ASEAN, has become a major link between India and ASEAN countries. And North East, particularly Manipur ought to become the center of thriving and integrated economic space linking two dynamic regions with a network of highways, railways, pipeline, and transmission lines crisscrossing the region.

And therefore development of the North East is thus integral to India's policy on Myanmar.
Indian private sector companies have a good track record of setting up greenfield airports and ports. These could be additional areas of our collaboration.

The beautiful Inlya Lake in Shan State
In terms of land connectivity, India's National Thermal Power Corporation has envisioned a vision plan for the next 20 years. Additional rail link and the Sittwe-Aizwal-North Assam road link are also new plans. These should be viewed as long term strategic investments from India and be expedited.

Manipur, shares a 398-km border with Myanmar. But more importantly the border town of Moreh has been a traditional trading hub with Myanmar and therefore has vast potential to become a major export centre from India for the South-East Asian region. Here's why: According to available statistics, bilateral trade between India and Myanmar more than doubled between 2005 and 2010, expanding from $557 million to $1.2 billion, most of it through Moreh. Disappointingly though, it pales in comparison to the bilateral trade between China and Myanmar which in 2010 amounted to an estimated $3 billion.

A mother with her child outside a Pagoda: Happy people
Nevertheless, with better connectivity and implementation of various development projects, the Asian Highway would enable the North-East region to become a business hub of South Asia. Economic linkages already exist by virtue of the prevailing legal and illegal trade between India and Myanmar through Moreh, a business border town in Manipur, and Tamu in Myanmar. Concrete economic benefits are expected to come up in the region with establishment of border haats. In addition, internal trade routes have the potential to enhance accessibility to sub-regional markets that connect Bangladesh, Myanmar and Bhutan.

Thus, with the coming of the Asian Highway, Myanmar will become the point of convergence as well as the linking route between India and the other South-East Asian countries. That, in turn, will lead to the creation of more secure and safe living spaces for the populace residing on either side of the border.

But there are apprehensions too. Local people in the North East fear that the opening of the Asian Highway and absence of inadequate enforceable regulation on immigration, illegal migration into the region may increase manifold. Also past promises have not been translated into real progress.

Us at the Mandalay Palace
Many remembered November 2004, when a similar car rally was organised between Guwahati and Singapore, passing through the Indian states of Assam, Nagaland and Manipur. Then too, the rally was seen as the beginning of a new era in connecting India's isolated North Eastern region to East and South East Asia. Manipur, in particular hoped the new initiative would help it overcome its inherent handicap of being a remote and landlocked state, as it would have brought huge improvement in infrastructure, particularly the roads leading in and out of the state.

Alas, that was not to be.

It is the failure of actualising intent that rankles in Manipur. That, combined with multiple frustrations emanating from prolonged bouts of economic blockades, a state administration in terminal atrophy and the continued and unchallenged writ of underground armed groups, has left the people despondent. It is this hopelessness that the Centre and state government must work hard to overcome. For that, a solution to long-standing ethnic insurgencies has to be found in double-quick time.

Now is the time to press for peace and security in Manipur since politics in Myanmar are undergoing a dramatic change. With the junta taking tentative steps towards genuine democracy and showing signs of warming towards India, New Delhi must seize this moment to establish lasting trade and cultural ties with its eastern neighbour. But before India can play a larger role in Maynmar, it needs to fix Manipur's broken socio-political landscape.
A superb holiday destination so far ignored by Indians
Manipur and to a lesser extent Nagaland must take advantage of the liberalisation that is taking place in Myanmar. But that potential can be fully realised only if New Delhi starts looking at Manipur as an important starting point in India's 'Look East' policy instead as a dead end of the country's road network.