Don't rush into dialogue with Pakistan, warn stalwarts

The killing of  five Indian soldiers in Poonch sector of the Line of Control (LoC) earlier this week and the subsequent fiasco over the Defence Minister's contradictory statements in Parliament has generated a huge controversy. Despite the uproar, many commentators and politicians have suggested that dialogue with Pakistan must be "uninterrupted and uninterruptable." 

Disturbed by the ongoing development, 41 strategic affairs experts formerly with the Army, Navy, Air Force, IFS, IB, RAW and the Civil Services and now prominent commentators and writers got together in New Delhi today and issued the following statement urging the government NOT to go ahead with dialogue with Pakistan. Here's the full text. Their names are at the end of the statement. The collective wisdom of these stalwarts is not some thing to be sneezed at. The question is: Does the establishment have the sagacity to listen to these voices of caution?

The full statement for whatever it is worth:

Reports indicate that with the change of government in Pakistan and the exchange of visits by special envoys, the Government of India is prepared to resume the composite/comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan, interrupted since January this year as a sequel to the beheading of Indian soldiers by the Pakistani army on the LOC in J&K. The possibility that discussions on Sir Creek and Tulbul Navigation may take place even before the proposed meeting of the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers in September in New York on the margins of the UNGA meeting has been aired in the media. Reports indicate that all these are being done without any linkage to the 26/11 terror attack or to the issue of Pakistan sponsored terrorism.

The Joint Statement issued after the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan in 2009 alluded to the resumption of the Composite Dialogue Process, while proclaiming: “Action against terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue Process”. The Dialogue that followed with Pakistan was identical in substance and form with the Composite Dialogue Process. This Dialogue Process was agreed to in 1997. It remained suspended after the Kargil Conflict and the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. It was resumed only after a cease-fire along the LoC in Jammu & Kashmir took effect in November 2003 and a categorical public assurance received by then Prime Minister Vajpayee from then President Musharraf in January 2004 that territory under Pakistan’s control would not be used for terrorism against India. The Sharm el-Sheikh Declaration and the business-as-usual Composite Dialogue that followed has emboldened the Pakistan establishment to stall, obfuscate and delay action against the perpetrators and masterminds of the 26/11 terrorist attack. The Pakistan establishment has quite evidently concluded that India does not expect firm action against those perpetrating terrorism from its soil and that terrorism and dialogue can go hand in hand.

The government would be well advised not to rush into a dialogue with Pakistan on the assumption that the new Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mian Nawaz Sharif, is ostensibly committed to improving ties with India. Good intentions are not sufficient to create conditions for productive negotiations; concrete actions on the ground are required. All the more so because of known structural impediments on the Pakistani side to normalization of India-Pakistan ties represented by the mind-set of the Pakistani military and the jihadi groups nurtured by them. The threat of India-directed terrorism from Pakistani soil is far from being eliminated.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif promise to expedite the trial of those accused of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks and grant India MFN status agreed to by the previous government has not been kept. On the contrary, we see negative developments that can seriously set back the relationship. Our Consulate in Jalalabad has been subject to a terrorist attack for the first time, raising questions about the timing. This has been followed by the highly provocative killing of five Indian soldiers inside our territory in J&K a couple of days ago. Earlier on, the Pakistani Foreign Office issued a statement on a recent incident of firing inside J&K, the harshness of which was incompatible with a desire to turn a new page in bilateral ties. In this context, the implications of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s declared intention to focus on resolving the Kashmir issue need to be properly analyzed.

The trend lines of Pakistan’s hostile acts, both through its organs of state and sponsored non-state actors, which are accompanied by implausible and even insulting denials and explanations, do not show signs of reversal under Pakistan’s new government which has blandly denied even the occurrence of the latest incident of the killing of our soldiers. Since the beginning of this year, 57 incidents of border violations have occurred. The Raksha Mantri has informed Parliament that both infiltration by terrorists and cease-fire violations on the LoC have increased by more than 80 percent since last year.

In these circumstances, it is evident that the euphoria over the change of government in Pakistan, and its initial statements is misplaced. India would be well advised to calibrate its approach to Pakistan not to mere assurances and promises of a desire for normalization of relations but to concrete indicators that the latter is moving away from the use of terror as an instrument of foreign policy.

Over the years, we have put behind us many instances of hostile acts by Pakistan, including the terrorist attacks against the symbols of our democracy, our centres of economic activity, our cities and our streets, in the hope that engagement and dialogue will change Pakistan’s behavior in its own interest. The meagre results of this policy are apparent. It is unfortunate that we have learnt nothing from this and have gone to make compromise after compromise with Pakistan simply to keep some kind of engagement going. Such a policy of appeasement has manifestly failed to deliver results – as indeed all appeasement must fail. This is the ineluctable lesson of history.

The way forward is for all Indians, and the government in particular, to develop a national consensus on issues of national security, counter-terrorism and defence preparedness, de-linking them from electoral politics. Ill-advised attempts and measures to denigrate and undermine the functioning of vital institutions like the Army and the Intelligence Bureau through motivated assertions and leaks to the media are a cause of serious concern. These inflict incalculable damage  on vital security institutions and systems, and on the morale of the personnel concerned.

At a time when Pakistan is day in and day out using terrorism against us, it would be ill-advised for the Prime Minister to meet with Nawaz Sharif as it would signal that relations between the two countries are in a business-as-usual mode. India should show no anxiety to hold a dialogue with Pakistan, keep a steady focus on the issue of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in any conversation that takes place, abjure language that equates our problems with terrorism with those of Pakistan, and take Siachen out of the basket of issues to be discussed with Pakistan as and when a dialogue is resumed, in view of the evolution of the ground situation in the area.

India has for much too long meekly put up with Pakistan-inspired terrorism and our citizens across the country have paid a terrible price. This has only encouraged Pakistan in its pursuit of such policies. It is time that policies are devised that will impose a cost on Pakistan for its export of terror to India, and thus change the cost-benefit calculus of these policies and actions. A proactive approach by India towards Pakistan must be the order of the day, as it will yield us much better results than those garnered by policies of appeasement which have regrettably been pursued by us for years.

We therefore strongly recommend that we do not rush into a dialogue with Pakistan, and the proposed meeting between the Prime Ministers of the two countries be cancelled.

 SIGNATORIES TO THE STATEMENT

1.     Mr Anil Baijal, former Home Secretary

2.     Amb Satish Chandra, former Deputy National Security Advisor

3.     Maj Gen Ramesh C Chopra, Strategic Expert

4.     Lt Gen Shantonu Choudhry, former Vice Chief of Army Staff

5.     Amb Rajiv Dogra, former High Commissioner to Italy & Romania

6.     Mr Ajit Doval, former Director Intelligence Bureau

7.     Air Marshal Satish Inamdar, former Vice Chief of Air Staff

8.     Mr DR Kaarthikeyan, former Director Central Bureau of Investigation

9.     Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, former Director Centre for Land Warfare Studies

10.     Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch, Director Centre for Land Warfare Studies

11.     Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy, former Chief of Air Staff

12.     Lt Gen NC Marwah, former CISC & GOC-in-C Andaman and Nicobar Command

13.     Maj Gen Ashok Mehta, former GOC IPKF

14.     Mr Nripendra Mishra, former Chairman, TRAI

15.     Mr DC Nath, former Special Director Intelligence Bureau

16.     Vice Admiral KK Nayyar, former Vice Chief of Naval Staff

17.     Amb G Parthasarathy, former High Commissioner to Pakistan

18.     Brig Vijay Raheja, Strategic Expert

19.     Amb M Rasgotra, former Foreign Secretary

20.     Mr RN Ravi, former Special Secretary Intelligence Bureau

21.     Gen Shankar RoyChowdhury, former Chief of Army Staff

22.     Mr CD Sahay, former Secretary Research & Analysis Wing

23.     Lt Gen Ravi Sawhney, former Deputy Chief of Army Staff

24.     Brig Vijai Sawhney, Strategic Expert

25.     Amb JC Sharma, former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs

26.     Gen VN Sharma, former Chief of Army Staff

27.     Amb Prabhat Shukla, former High Commissioner to Russia

28.     Amb Kanwal Sibal, former Foreign Secretary

29.     Amb Rajiv Sikri, former Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs

30.     Mr Dhirendra Singh, former Home Secretary

31.     Lt Gen PK Singh, Director United Service Institution of India

32.     Mr Prakash Singh, former DG Border Security Force

33.     Lt Gen SK Sinha, former Vice Chief of Army Staff & Governor J&K & Assam

34.     Lt Gen DS Thakur, former Deputy Chief of Army Staff

35.     AVM AK Tiwary, former Chief Operations Officer, Air Command

36.     Mr AK Verma, former Secretary Research & Analysis Wing

37.     Gen NC Vij, former Chief of Army Staff

38.     Brig RS Chhikara, Strategic Expert

39.     Brig Vinod Anand, Strategic Expert

40.     Col Karan Kharb, ex Commanding Officer, 21 Bihar Regiment

41.     Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee, former Chief of Staff, Central Command

Political expediency cannot mix with military action

The ceasfire put in place at the line of control (LoC) between India and Pakistan in November 2003 is all but a charade now. Brutal killings, cross-border raids, medium and heavy firing with small arms and mortars has increased exponentially over the past couple of years. This calendar year alone, there have been 57 ceasfire violations by Pakistan, a whopping 80 per cent jump from 2012. The number of infiltration attempts have risen dramatically too. But more than anything else, it is the intention of the Pakistani Army and ISI to keep the pot boiling in Kashmir that has not changed, ceasefire or no ceasefire.

Recall what the then Northern Army Commander Lt Gen KT Parnaik told me in an interview on June 17 less than two months ago: "With we have to understand that the infrastructure that supports and propels this entire proxy war across the border is intact, whether they are the training camps or the launching pads or the communication facilities. Secondly the continued efforts of the establishment in Pakistan to push the infiltrators across the LoC continue. 

"The number of ceasefire violations that we have had and a large number of incidents in which they had tried to breach the LoC and the fence has been detected in the past. So I feel as long as the intention on the infrastructure doesn't change we cannot keep our guard down. While these figures have marginally changed over a period of time, it is not the numbers that are important, it is the fact that they continue to be there and every season these camps get activated for training and motivation. Intelligence agencies have confirmed that these camps continue to be active. So they are talking about 42 camps across and 4,000-5,000 is generally the strength. They come for training and go away, but the important part is why should the adversary maintain these camps, why should they give them the patronage? They get arms, equipment, state of the art communication equipment and wherewithal to carry out infiltration. This itself highlights the problems that exist today. Despite a number of dialogues, there is no improvement, that's why we can't let our guard down."

Words of a true professional who foresaw what is in store.

Despite all the professed willingness showed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to take the peace process with India forward, as long as the Pakistani Army and ISI along with groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba, remain inimical to India, no amount of dialogue will calm the situation on the LoC.

The Indian establishment, especially those pushing for talks with Pakistan at any cost must take this factor into account. Can Sharif enure the closure of these camps? Can New Delhi hold Islamabad accountable to the promise it made in January 2004 that Pakistan will not allow its territory or territory controlled by it to be used by terrorists for anti-India activities?

If there is no guarantee on this count, no amount of conferences on the sidelines of UN General Assembly or otherwise, are going to bear any fruit.

That said, the Indian security establishment, especially the Indian Army will have to look within and review some of the procedures and tactics that are being employed along the LoC. When the January beheading of an Indian soldier happened, there were were murmurs that there could have been tactical errors on part of the patrol party that allowed the Pakistani Border Action Team (BAT) to kill the two Indian soldiers. 

After the killing of 5 soldiers on Monday night-Tuesday morning, the murmurs have become a louder. An initial internal assessment of the incident points to tactical lapses by the local unit. A couple of questions need quick answers for the situation to be rectified. One, why was the area domination patrol strenth only 6 and not minimum 10  (a section) as is the standrad practice? Some reports have suggested that the outgoing ballation (21 Bihar) was showing the incoming unit (14 Maratha) the key locations and a bunker ahead of the fence but well within the LoC. If that be so, why take the new unit on a familiarisation exercise at night? Also was the patrolling pattern repeated without variation over a prolonged period giving the adversary the chance to observer it closely and then attack at a time and place of its choosing?

No doubt, all these possible shortcomings are being looked into. Surely the commanders on ground would know that the most vulnerable period on the LoC is during the chnage over of units. The old unit is in transfer mode, the new one is on unfamiliar territory. That's when the adversary is known to strike. In 2010, in the Uri sector, two Indian soldiers were beheaded in exactly these circumstances. That Indian troops hit back appropriately with similar tactics is also well known.

But there is a larger question here posed by veterans of Kashmir deployment: Have commanders on the ground lost the ability to take initiative and launch punitive action against raiding Pakistani forces? Has the leadership developed cold feet in taking actions that are well within its realm of responsibility? 

Sample what one veteran emailed to me in the immediate aftermath of the killing of 5 soldiers. : "If I were the CO, I would have launched adecisive counter attack to make the enemy pay with or without permission from my superiors and to hell with the consequences. Such actions are not without precedents. In the early 60s, there was anincident of beheading in Blue Sector (J&K) which was answered by an immediate counter attack by the battalion after which there was no such incident till the battalion was de-inducted. The Company commander later on rose to be an Army Commander. And then there was a Corps Commander (who later on became the Chief) who ordered punitive action with telling effect without any sanction from the Army Commander. When pulled up, he said that seeking permission for local actions would only result in delaying the response which would have finally ended in a stalemate. No further questions were asked. At present we only seem to be reacting instead of (pre-) acting and/or pro-acting. Its time we went on the offensive with a series of attacks which will give a clear message to the enemy that we mean business. Endless inaction on our part will certainly leave us in a demoralised state. If this course leads to war, so be it. Patience seems to our only strong point at present." 

2013, admittedly is not the 1960s but bold local commanders are known to be appropriately aggressive even in the past half a dozen years. Of late however, there is a tendency to be ultra cautious, to look for directions from the top before taking any step considered out of the box.

After all is said and done, Indian Army must also review its counter-infiltration operating procedure on the LoC. In all likelihood commanders on ground are constrained by an overwhelming urge to look for signal from the brass before taking any tough step. 

They will have to revisit the old adage: what is militarily desirable is not necessarily politically correct. They must know that mixing political expediency with military action is suicidal. Only then Indian army officers can regain the confidence of its men and thereby the Indian citizens.

Mountain Strike Corps or 3 Carrier Strike Groups? One need not come at the cost of the other!

A fortnight after the government gave an in-principle clearance to raise a Mountain Strike Corps, a debate over the efficacy of the decision to spend over Rs 64,000 crores on the new accretion has begun. Noted Strategic Affairs expert, former Rear Admiral Raja Menon writing in The Hindu has in fact categorically asserted: "A geographically limited one axis offensive will not destabilise the PLA, but a flotilla of nuclear submarines and a three carrier air group in the Indian Ocean can economically cripple mainland China." 

Others have also weighed in with their opinion essentially making the point that India should invest more in its Navy than sinking money in troops-intensive mountain strike corps. 

The nub of this argument is: a powerful blue-water Indian Navy can choke the sea lines of communication (SLOC) so vital for China by strategic interdiction on the high seas and therefore the Indian Navy's capability to enforce a blockade must be strengthened. This theory assumes that India can unilaterally do so in case China assumes a belligerent posture across the Himalaya. If push comes to shove, India will certainly be forced to look at this option but the SLOCs are not an exclusive preserve of either India or China and the international community is therefore bound to intervene to keep the passage free to enable trade and commerce to function normally. A selective blockade of China-centric sea traffic is realistically difficult to implement even if on paper the prospect looks alluring.

However if a conflict between India and China breaks out in the high mountains, the world is not going to be overly bothered for a while. India therefore needs to be prepared to meet this threat all along the 4,000 km long boundary with China. The likelihood of a limited skirmish in the mountains is much more than a confrontation at sea simply because the border remains un-demarcated and prone to frequent misinterpretation and misunderstanding.

The need to have more forces for the northern frontier cannot be overemphasised. This does not mean it should come at the cost of preventing the Indian Navy from expanding. Going by the information available in the open domain, the Indian Navy is in the middle of one of its most ambitious modernisation programmes. Apart from the planned—even if delayed—induction of INS Vikramaditya, the aircraft carrier built in Russia and currently under sea trials, 47 ships of different types and capability are on order in various Indian shipyards. India’s first indigenously built nuclear-powered submarine is also scheduled to embark on its first sea acceptance trial around end-August. The first Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) is scheduled to cross a major landmark two weeks from now. The design and concept for the second IAC is also more or less finalised. So the Navy is doing just fine. With the Navy’s long-standing emphasise on acquiring indigenously-built platforms, Indian shipyards can cope only with these many numbers for at least another 10 years.

After that, if more money is required, India can always find resources to fund further expansion of the Indian Navy. 

But to get back to the creation of a Moutain Strike Corps. According to available information, it is just the first step in what is needed urgently –the addition of 40,000 new troops to the Indian Army. The budget of Rs 64,000 crore for the new corps  is to be spent over seven years –- which is just as well since raising new formations as large as a Corps is not an easy task. It is further difficult to make that formation capable of mountain warfare. For mountains gobble up troops; they take a heavy toll on man and machine. 

The decision on 17 July is somewhat reminiscent of a similar choice exercised by the UPA government almost exactly four years ago.

The then outgoing UPA-I government's Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) was meeting for the last time before the results of the 2009 general elections were to be announced. The sole item on the agenda: Enhancing India's military preparedness against China.

According to insiders present at that meeting, some of the members of the CCS wanted to leave the decision to the next government but better sense prevailed and days before Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's first UPA government went ahead and sanctioned raising of two new Mountain Divisions for deployment in India's north eastern State of Arunachal Pradesh, an area claimed by China as South Tibet. In addition, the Indian Air Force was given the go ahead to reactivate half a dozen Advance Landing Grounds (ALGs) spread all along the Arunachal-Tibet portion of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries and base additional squadrons of Sukhoi-30 combat jets in Assam.

The goal was to plug existing gaps in India’s preparedness along the Arunachal Pradesh-China frontier. The two new divisions were to include a squadron of India’s armoured spearhead—Soviet-built T-90 tanks--and a regiment of artillery. 

Now four years later, the two mountain divisions have completed their recruitment, equipping and orbatting in the North-east. One of them--the 56 Mountain Division--after being raised in Nagaland's Zakhama area has been placed at Lekhabali, north of the Brahmaputra adding teeth to Indian Army's presence in East and Central Arunachal Pradesh. The other new Division--71--headquartered at Missamari in the plains of Assam, will enhance troop deployment beyond Tawang in West Arunachal Pradesh in addition to the 5 Mountain Division already stationed at Tenga.

However one lacuna continues to persist. Road links to forward areas remain tenuous. The China Study Group (CSG), which controls India's policy on China had sanctioned 72 tactically important roads to be built in the tough, mountainous terrain along the China border in the Eastern and the Western sectors. The roads are being built by the quasi-military Border Roads Organisation to enhance connectivity. But a combination of lethargic BRO, obstructionist state governments and ministry of environment and forests has meant that these roads are nowhere near completion. Similarly, the half a dozen ALGs in Arunachal Pradesh are also stuck in red tape.

The recent incursion by Chinese troops in Ladakh's Depsang area should serve as a timely reminder to the government that timelines for infrastructure development along the Chinese frontier and plans to boost military capability do not have the luxury of slippages.

Diplomacy and timing (cancellation of Chinese Premier's visit over the border standoff would have been a loss of face for Beijing) helped end the face off this time but New Delhi will do well to remember such incident is not going to be one off. The Chinese will continue to nibble at the un-demarcated border and test India's response as they have done for over 50 years.

What will be crucial for the new corps is cooperation and coordination between all stake-holders:  The Defence, Finance and Environment Ministries, as well as the Army, Air Force and Border Roads Organization. 

In the recent past, objections from the Environment Ministry have impeded upon the construction of crucial roads in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh, Ladakh and Uttarakhand. In the last case, the lack of connectivity was driven home brutally when torrential rains ripped open the state last month, leaving thousands stranded. 

It is nobody's case that the environment should not be protected but a balance needs to be struck in caring for the environment and national security imperatives. The state governments will need to back the plan by facilitating the speedy allotment of land in remote areas. 

The climate in most of these states means that the Border Roads Organization can leverage, at best, a four-month season to deliver new routes. 

Similarly, establishing permanent infrastructure for troops, including hubs that supply ammunition and deciding strategically-placed artillery gun positions is a long -term and complicated process. 

Finding the right contractors with the right skills and willingness to work on isolated, remote areas is another big challenge. The Indian Air Force, for instance, has been trying for three years to sign contracts that will lead the upgrading seven Advanced Landing Grounds or ALGS, crucial for the ability to quickly airlift troops to strategic parts along the China border.  But the deals have not been closed because expert contractors find it difficult to work in these areas. 

The new mountain corps will require light artillery which can be easily transported, even airlifted in the highest mountains. Given India's painfully-slow process of weapons acquisition, empowering the Mountain Strike Corps quickly will be a big challenge. 

It is all the more necessary for the government to walk the talk in making the new formation a reality by adhering to timelines.

Simultaneously, India must re-look and re-tweak its China policy. 

For instance:

• Insist with Beijing the need for exchanging maps for all sectors immediately so that each side knows the other's claimed LAC and border negotiations can resume

• Instead of pushing for operational control of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP),    the Army should step up and assume responsibility to protect the disputed border.

• Ensure timely and effective information sharing mechanism with Indian media and through them the Indian people rather than let different stake holders speak in different and sometimes discordant voices during times of crisis.

• Educate and prepare the Indian people on the need for give and take on border negotiations in the future.

Policy makers in India must be mindful of the fact that military preparedness and trying to improve diplomatic relations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

8 Mountain Div: Forever in Operations: A tribute

Fifty years ago, the Indian Army raised a new formation, primarily to combat insurgency in the north-east. Today, not only it has accomplished its missions in the north-east along with Jammu and Kashmir, but more importantly, won the Kargil conflict for India in 1999.

This is the story of the formation, the 8 Mountain division, which is 'Forever in Operations'.

(Video is here:http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/ndtv-special-ndtv-24x7/the-kargil-victors-8-mountain-division-forever-in-operations/283886?pfrom=home-lateststories)
 
Headquartered in Khumbathang behind a huge mountain feature, the 8 Mountain Division, ever since it was raised in 1963, has mostly operated in the mountains and delivered results every time. There are numerous tales of valour and dedication of the Indian Army, but what makes 8 Mountain Division stand out is its adaptability.
 

Under Major General KV Krishna Rao, who later became Chief of Army Staff, the Division moved to fight in east Pakistan to help create Bangladesh. Besides General Rao, this division has produced two more Army Chiefs--General BC Joshi and General VP Malik.
 
For the first 27 years, it operated in the states of Nagaland and Manipur combating insurgencies, earning the soubriquet - 'Forever in Operations'.
 
As trouble erupted in Kashmir in the late 80s, the Army headquarters decided to fall back upon the 8 Mountain Division. Major General VP Malik moved it to the Kashmir Valley, making it the spearhead of the counter-insurgency operations.
 
However, the formation is equated with the 1999 Kargil conflict. Captain Vikram Batra, Anuj Nayyar, Vikrant Thapar and many other became household names for their daring exploits at impossible heights.
 
During this month 14 years ago, last of the Pakistani intruders were evicted from the heights of Kargil-Drass and Batalik underlining the importance of 8 Mountain Division. Hastily rushed into this sector from Kashmir Valley, it took the might of the Bofors guns and the raw courage of the soldiers to earn a hard-earned victory in the forbidding mountains.

Its current General Officer Commanding, Major General Shokin Chauhan, says: "The posts are high, the altitude is difficult, the mountains are treacherous, the wind is bad and we have an enemy on the Line Of Control, which has not yet stabilized. So all in all it makes for a very difficult job for our boys to do, but they do it commendably. And I hope, very strongly, that people will recognize the valour of the soldiers of 8 mountain division and accept that the Indian Army soldier is better than the best." 
 
The 1999 conflict was also one of those rare battles in which the infantry soldier and artillery guns played almost equal role in overcoming the adversary. At such altitude, the artillery will remain a vital element of warfare.

While the 1999 war may never be repeated, it is essential to keep the memory of those who made the supreme sacrifice alive. Every year on July 26, the Indian Army remembers its heroes, who won the Kargil conflict.

Only money for a Mountain Strike Corps in not enough

After the initial euphoria, the reality check.

The financial sanction given by India's Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on Wednesday to raise a Mountain Strike Corps specifically aimed at launching offensive operations against China--if need be--is but a first step in what promises to be a long haul in adding 40,000 new troops to the country's 1.3 million strong Army.

The figure of Rs 64,000 crore (roughly 11 billion dollars at 1$= Rs 60 rate), remember, is to be spent over seven years which is just as well since raising new formations as large as a Corps is not an easy task. It is further difficult to make that formation capable of mountain warfare. For mountains gobble up troops; they take a heavy toll on man and machine. Living at altitudes upwards of 12,000 feet going upto 22,000 feet and being fighting fit is no child's play. The Himalaya--along which the entire 4,000 km China frontier is spread out--is an unforgiving terrain. So just 'sanctioning" money will mean nothing.

A sustained effort by all stakeholders--MoD, Ministry of finance, Army, IAF, Border Roads Organisation and most importantly the Ministry of Forest and Environment along with respective state governments--will have to be on the same page if the wish to have a Mountain Strike Corps is to be translated into a reality.

Why do I mention all these ministries? Because in the recent past, the 'Green Brigade' has proved to be a big obstacle in building strategic roads in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Ladakh. It is nobody's case that environment should not be protected but a balance needs to struck in caring for the environment and national security imperatives. The state governments will need to back the plan by facilitating speedy allotment of land in far flung areas.

Building roads in the higher reaches if these states is a painstaking process with the working season available to the Border Roads barely limited to three or four months. Similarly establishing permanent infrastructure for troops, creating a stable logistics line, putting in place ammunition and supply hubs besides strategically placed artillery gun positions is a long term process. Nothing is going to be easy.

The Defence Ministry will have to work in close coordination with the Finance Ministry to release required funds on time.

Finding the right contractors with the right skills and willingness to work on isolated, remote areas is another big challenge. The IAF for instance has been trying to finalise contracts to upgrade seven advanced landing grounds (ALGs) in Arunachal Pradesh to enhance its ability to airlift troops rapidly all along the China frontier for the past three tears but is still to a find a satisfactory solution.

Infrastructure apart, equipping mountain troops with the requisite wherewithal is a complicated task. Purchasing special winter clothing, imparting high altitude warfare skills to troops is easier than acquiring mountain specific weapons platforms is not.

The new mountain corps will require to have inbuilt airlift capability, light artillery which can be easily transported, even airlifted in the high mountains. Given India's painfully slow process of weapons acquisition, empowering the Mountain Strike Corps quickly will be a big challenge.

Given these difficulties, Beijing will not be unduly bothered although it will certainly make the mandatory noises may be by describing the Indian decision as provocative. 

It is all the more necessary for the government to walk the talk in making the new formation a reality by adhering to the timelines.

 

Also See: http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/new/NDTV-Show-Special.aspx?ID=507

 

And this:

 

http://nitinagokhale.blogspot.in/2012/10/recalling-1962-half-century-on-my-small.html

Forever in Operations: Story of 8 Mountain Division

The Formation sign

Travelling to Kargil and Drass from Srinagar has never been easy. For years since 1999, that is what I have felt despite making at least two dozen trips. Last week was no different. The challenge posed by the might Zozilla, the traffic, the terrain everything is different than one normally encounters.

A glimpse of various operations by 8 Div

Between Monday and Saturday, me and cameraperson colleague Tariq revisited the Kargil-Drass-Batalik sector to make a programme on the 8 Moutain division AOR (Area of Responsibility). Why 8 Mountain Division? 

8 Mountain Div in action

One because I have had an old association with this remarkable formation, raised half a century ago to combat the Naga insurgency. This has been the Indian Army's "go-to" formation in every major military campaign since the mid-1960s. 

In every crisis, it has been called upon to deliver. In 1971, in the middle of combating a tough Naga insurgency, the Division was called upon to take on the Pakistanis in the 1971 war which it did with great elan and played a major part in India's greatest military victory.

The magnificent Drass War Memorial

Back in the North-east after the East Pakistan campaign, it took on the responsibility of combating Meitei and Tripura insurgencies in the 1970s and 1980s. When Kashmir erupted in 1989, Army HQ selected the 8 Mountain Division to move to the valley. Again it proved its worth by chalking up major successes in the CI operations between 1990-99. 

In the summer of 1999 Pakistani intruders caught the Indians napping in Kargil-Drass-Mushok-Batalik sectors. Once again, 8 Mountain Division was drafted to evict the  intruders from those impossible heights which it did--at a major cost to lives and limbs of gallant soldiers. Since then 8 Div has been stationed in this area.

While I will be writing a more detailed account of the division whose motto is FOREVER IN OPERATIONS, one fact needs to be mentioned here: 8 Mountain Division has given the Indian Army 3 Chiefs in the past and the next likely Chief has also had the distinction of commanding it! The 3 Chiefs in the past were: Gen KV Krishna Rao, Gen BC Joshi (who is no more) and Gen VP Malik. The next likely chief is Lt Gen Dalbir Singh Suhag, currently India's Eastern Army Commander. Here's a small glimpse into the sector.

On the road to Kargil

Crossing the Zozilla is never easy

Morning prayers at Army's Goodwill school at Kumbathang, the HQ of 8 Div

The Indus before it enters Pakistan

The road to Batalik

BRO road sign

A local woman collecting Apricot on the road!

Only in Drass: Sun peeping out from the clouds

Mohd. Razzak, who gives a scintillating commentrary at the War memorial

One of the high passes in the area

With a filed gun battery at Ganasok

Kargil town, now a flourishing trade centre

The trainees at the Kargil Battle School

A soldier stands guard at Biamah

With soldiers at Gumri, gateway to Zozilla

The formidable Zozilla

Zozilla: Always a challenge to man and machine